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Law and Inequality
A Fable
Once upon a time, in a land far away, there was a swamp.
This swamp was dank, dismal, and infested with crocodiles, poison-
ous snakes and other vermin. A whirlpool pulled people unfortu-
nate enough to fall into the swamp deeper and deeper into its
vortex, until they drowned or were destroyed by the vermin. This
was not a place into which any sane person would wish to venture.
Unfortunately, every so often a hapless traveller would stumble by
and find herself pulled into the quagmire.
Not far from the swamp there lived a man. The man, having
grown up near the swamp, knew its eddies and currents, its ebbs
and flows, its pitfalls and escape routes. He knew how to save hap-
less travellers who might stumble into the swamp. However, he
was also an ideologue. His mission in life was to reform the world
according to his personal vision of morality and right. He consid-
ered each traveller who stumbled by a page onto which he might
write his particular vision of morality and justice. Each time he
heard the horrified screams of a traveller in distress, he thought,
"Aha, someone I can save." However, his rescue always had a price.
The price was that the traveller agree to forfeit her freedom, to live
within the rescuer's homestead, and to abide by his moral require-
ments. If she did not agree, or if at any later time she departed
from the ethical code, she was simply thrown back into the swamp.
Indeed, these rescue rejects were the primary source of nourish-
ment for the vermin within.
Was this Samaritan good?
Introduction
A recent political rallying cry has been welfare reform.'
Policymakers, including President Clinton2 and the United States
1. See, e.g., David Whitman, War on Welfare Dependency, U.S. NEWS AND
WoRLD REP., Apr. 20, 1992, at 34; Kitty Dumas, Can the Welfare System be Re-
formed, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 1992, at 27; James Barnes, Waiting for Clinton,
THE NAT'L J., Mar. 5, 1994, at 516. Of course, the concept of welfare reform is not
new. As a political football, post-war-on-poverty welfare reform has a long history.
See, e.g., Linda E. Demkovich, Moynihan on Welfare from FAP to the Carter Plan,
TI NAT'L J., Jan. 28, 1978, at 146 (discussing Nixon and Carter Administration
welfare reform plans); The $60 Billion Welfare Failure: What Carter Could Do, Bus.
WE., Jan. 17, 1977, at 48; Julie Kosterlitz, Reexamining Welfare, THE NAT'L J., Dec.
6, 1986, at 2926 (discussing the Reagan Administration and welfare reform).
2. See generally DEP'T oF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DETAILED SUMMARY,
WoRK AND RESPONSIBnrry ACT OF 1994, 35-36 (Proposed Act) [hereinafter SuM-
MARY, WoRK & RESPONSmIITY ACT].
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Congress,3 have advocated revamping, or in some instances dis-
mantling, the American welfare system. Many reform programs
link welfare benefits to behavioral changes by welfare recipients.
For example, programs such as Workfare and Learnfare require
welfare recipients to do community service or enter educational pro-
grams as a condition of receiving benefits.4 Other programs reward
welfare recipients who marry. Some of these proposals are in-
tended to help welfare beneficiaries become self-sufficient and in-
dependent of the welfare system.5 However, other proposals
appear designed to punish welfare recipients for violating state-fa-
vored behavioral norms or values and to manipulate recipients into
complying with these norms.6
Recent moves by several states, 7 the Clinton Administration, 8
and now the Republican 104th Congress, 9 to place a ceiling upon
3. See The Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) [hereinafter Personal Responsibility Act]; see also 141 CoNG. Rc. H3790
(1995). This bill was passed by the United States House of Representatives on May
24, 1995, and is currently under consideration by the United States Senate as the
Family Sufficiency Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
The bills generally would convert several federal welfare programs, including Aid for
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), into block grants to the states.
4. See generally Joanna K Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform:
'Workfare" Programs and Poor Women, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 415 (1991) (discussing
mandatory work requirements imposed as a condition of receiving public assistance
and their impact on women); Rhoda Schulzinger & Paula Roberts, Welfare Reform in
the States: Fact or Fiction?, Part I, CLEARiNGHOUSE REv., Dec. 1987, at 695 (discuss-
ing the use of work incentive programs in the welfare arena); Marc Stuart Gerber,
Equal Protection, Public Choice Theory, and Learnfare: Wealth Classifications Revis-
ited, 81 GEO. L.J. 2141 (1993) (discussing the welfare requirement of mandatory
school attendance for certain AFDC recipients).
5. See, e.g., Paula Roberts & Rhoda Schulzinger, Towards Reform of the Welfare
System: Is Consensus Emerging?, CLEARINGHOUSE REv., May 1987, at 3, 11-15 (dis-
cussing recent welfare reform proposals and state experiments).
6. See, e.g., Gloria Negri & Anthony Flint, States Take Hard Line on Depen-
dency: Punitive Actions Gaining Favor, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1994, at Al (discuss-
ing state welfare programs intended to change behavior by punishing non-compliant
recipients). Even the proposals designed to be helpful often contain punitive aspects.
For example, Clinton's welfare reform plan seeks to restructure welfare to make it
less dependency-fostering; however, it also contains many punitive measures that
use the club of welfare benefits to enforce behavioral choices promoted by the plan.
The Clinton plan thus promises "tough sanctions" including loss of welfare eligibility
for persons who refuse to stay in school, look for work, or attend job training pro-
grams. See SumnARy, WORK & REsPoNsmHrrY AcT, supra note 2, at 2, 15.
7. The first states that have received a federal waiver to implement these plans
include Wisconsin, New Jersey, Georgia, and Arkansas. Subsequently, several other
states have adopted or are considering legislation to adopt such plans, contingent
upon receipt of a federal waiver. See infra notes 28-33, 37-53 and accompanying
text.
8. See SumsARy, WORK & REsPoNsIBILrY AcT, supra note 2, at 35-37.
9. See Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 3. The bill would generally pro-
hibit states from disbursing federal welfare grants to children born to mothers re-
ceiving welfare. The House bill would also prevent states from using federal funds to
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welfare benefits awarded to mothers who give birth to additional
children while receiving welfare are pernicious examples of value-
intrusive welfare reform. These so-called family cap proposals
deny additional benefits for children over a certain number who are
born to welfare recipients. However, such benefits would have been
awarded if the child had been born or conceived before the family
began receiving welfare. Typically, such plans provide that a wel-
fare family of two children that has a third child cannot count the
third child for computing benefit levels. However, a family with
three children newly entering the welfare rolls can count all three
children for computing benefit levels.1O The proposals thus give
welfare recipients who decide to bear children less in future bene-
fits than non-welfare recipients who decide to bear children. Ac-
cordingly, the procreative choices of welfare recipients are expressly
disfavored over those of non-welfare recipients in determining wel-
fare benefit levels.']
The usual stated rationale for family cap or child limitation
proposals is to discourage welfare recipients from having additional
children.12 The proposals generally reflect the value that it is poor
provide cash welfare benefits to unwed mothers under 18 years of age, except in
cases of rape or incest. The Senate version of the bill neither forbids nor requires
states to deny aid to children born to welfare recipients and thus would leave this
issue for the states to decide.
10. See, e.g., N. J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10 - 3.5 (West 1992) (providing that the "Com-
missioner of Human Services shall... [eliminate] the increment in benefits under
the program for which that family would otherwise be eligible as a result of the birth
of a child during the period in which the family is eligible for AFDC benefits .... ").
11. The first court to address the legality of such plans upheld New Jersey's plan
against constitutional and statutory challenges. C. K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991
(D.N.J. 1995); see discussion infra note 22. There has been some critical scholarly
analysis of these proposals as well as much public comment. See, e.g., Lucy A. Wil-
liams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992) (arguing that these plans are poor policy largely motivated
by the public perception of welfare recipients as "others" who are to blame for their
own poverty); Martha F. Davis, The New Paternalism: Welfare's War on Women, 49
GuLD PRAc. 97 (1992) (arguing that these plans coerce procreative rights); Robert D.
Bomersbach, Note, New Jersey's Bryant Amendment: Is This Welfare Reform?, 15
WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 169 (1994) (questioning the legality of the New Jersey family
cap plan under the New Jersey Constitution and international human rights law).
See also Barbara Vobejda, Hot Debate on Welfare Children: Movement Would Limit
Benefits when Mothers Have More Babies, S.F. CHRON., June 7, 1994, at A6; Dorothy
Roberts, Exploding the Myths Behind New Jersey Welfare Reform, N.J. L.J., Jan. 25,
1993, at 21.
12. For a discussion of family cap plans, see infra part I. The proposals also
might be viewed as seeking to ameliorate some of the social costs to the general
public and welfare recipients of children born and raised in poverty. However, if this
is so, the proposals are a notoriously poor way to reduce the social costs of child
poverty. First, there is little evidence that denying benefits significantly deters
childbearing by welfare recipients. Indeed, it seems unlikely that a welfare recipient
would have an additional child simply to get additional welfare benefits since the
cost of supporting a child probably significantly exceeds whatever increase in bene-
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planning, bad judgment, an irresponsible lifestyle choice, or gener-
ally immoral behavior for poor persons to have children they cannot
support. By refusing to "reward" welfare recipients for their disap-
proved childbearing choices, the proposals use the club of welfare
benefits to impose this value choice upon them. The state, not the
parent, determines whether a welfare recipient should have addi-
tional children.13 The welfare child limitation proposals thus raise
fits would occur, causing a net financial loss to the family. Second, the proposals
actually increase the social costs of child poverty by denying needed welfare benefits
to poor children born to welfare recipients. Third, the proposals do not help children
of poor, non-welfare recipients and thus do not affect those social costs of poverty at
all. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11, at 736-741; Melinda Henneberger, State Aid
Is Capped, But To What Effect, N.Y. TNEs, Apr. 11, 1995, at Al (discussing lack of
clear evidence that New Jersey welfare plan has reduced births to welfare mothers).
See also Vobejda, supra note 11, at A6. Cf. New Jersey Experiment Sharply Cuts
Illegitimate Births among Welfare Mothers, HERITAGE FOUND. REI'., Feb. 9, 1995
(stating that illegitimate births among New Jersey AFDC recipients dropped 29%
after New Jersey imposed family cap; however, others argue that early New Jersey
numbers showing a 16% drop reflected delays in reporting new births by welfare
recipients no longer entitled to increases on new births, and since few welfare recip-
ients give birth, even a substantial percentage drop does not reflect significantly
lower numbers of births). In any event, even if these proposals do rot aim to over-
ride poor people's procreative value choices, they have that effect.
Some analysts argue that the best societal response to child poverty would be to
remedy structural economic problems that mire poor persons in poverty, e.g., in-
creasing the minimum wage and providing child care and health insurance for poor
persons. In contrast, these child limitation proposals merely divert public attention
from needed structural poverty reforms. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethink-
ing Welfare Dependency from a Different Ground, 81 GEo. L. J. 1961 (1993) (discuss-
ing the failure of welfare reform programs to address the true systemic causes of
welfare); Paula Roberts, Why Don't We Do it Right this Time? Redefining the Welfare
Reform Debate, CLEARINGHOUSE REv., Apr. 1988, at 1305 (arguing that reforming
the welfare system will not help the vast majority of the poor).
13. Moreover, under these plans the state frequently makes this judgment with-
out regard to the welfare mother's individual circumstances. For example, plans
often reduce aid even when the child is conceived by rape or incest; exceptions to this
rule are the Arkansas and Georgia plans. See ARKANSAS DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVICES,
ARKANSAS WELFARE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
§ 10111 (1) (1994) [hereinafter ARK. FAmmy ASSISTANCE MANUAL]; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-4-115 (1994). Some plans also reduce aid when the child is conceived because of
failed contraception; one exception is the Arkansas plan which provides that the re-
cipient may avoid the family cap limits by providing medical verification to the state
that she used a reliable (96% or better) method of contraception. ARK FAMILY
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra, § 10111(4). The Arkansas policy seems to require use of
medically installed methods of birth control, i.e., Norplant, IUDs, or sterilization,
given that a welfare recipient would not be able to obtain medical verification that
other types of contraception, such as birth control pills or condoms, had been prop-
erly used.
In other cases, the pregnancy may be caused, in part, by emotional pressure
from would-be fathers. This may particularly be a concern with teenage
pregnancies, which may often be linked to sexual abuse by older males. See, e.g.,
Mike Males, Poverty, Rape, Adult/Teen Sex: Why 'Pregnancy Prevention' Programs
Don't Work, 75 Pm DELTA KAPpAN, Jan. 1994, at 407-408 (stating that current data
indicates that the large majority of children born to teen mothers are fathered by
adult males rather than by fellow teens; reporting California data that shows 77% of
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the issue of whether government may constitutionally use its eco-
nomic power over welfare benefit allocations to leverage welfare re-
cipients' exercise of their constitutionally protected right to
procreative choice. Legally, the personal choice of whether to bear
or beget children is committed to an individual's private judgment
by the constitutional fundamental right to procreate. 14 This funda-
mental right to procreate provides that these essential value
choices are committed to the discretion of the individual, not the
discretion of the state. 1 5 Government burdens on the right are sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the importance of
the right to procreative choice.16 Nevertheless, current Supreme
Court doctrine, loosely known as the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, generally holds that only a government prohibition of,
burden on, or penalty for the exercise of a fundamental right vio-
lates the right, triggering strict scrutiny.17 Moreover, the Supreme
births by high school age girls, and 51% of births by girls of junior high school age or
younger, and national data that shows 71% of births to teenagers involved an adult
partner over age twenty). Similarly, teenage pregnancy may be correlated with child
sexual abuse. Mike Males cites a Washington study that found that two-thirds of a
study of five hundred adolescent mothers had, before their pregnancy, been sexually
victimized by men whose ages averaged twenty-seven years, an abuse statistic that
is at least twice as large as that for the general population. Id.
It is also irrelevant to the state plans whether the mother decided to complete
her family before her biological clock ticked to a stop; nor do the state plans seem to
consider that, to a welfare mother living a life of abject poverty in which simply
surviving from one day to the next in environments plagued by violence and victimi-
zation requires a triumph of the soul, children are her single most important value,
her only real source of hope for the future. See, e.g., Abi Berger, Young, Poor, and
Pregnant, THE LANCET, Nov. 13, 1993, at 1224 (suggesting that the poor adolescent
girl often becomes a mother because this role "fits with her 'internal sense' of who
she is, what she can do, and how she can best fit into her own community and
family").
None of these considerations are generally relevant to child limitation plans.
Instead, the only relevant consideration is that the state, with its complement of
hard-working, middle-class taxpayers, made the collective political decision that
such childbearing choices are, at best, "improvident" for those persons poor enough
to need welfare assistance, and consequently refused to "reward" such choices with
future subsistence support for the resulting children. See, e.g., WISCONSIN DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HumAN SERVICES, AFDC BENEFIT C"P (ABC) DEMONSTRATION PROJECT
2 (1995) (stating that denying cash benefits to additional children conceived on wel-
fare would emphasize responsible behavior in family planning decisions, encourage
employment, and focus on dedication to family).
14. See discussion infra part II.A.
15. This fundamental right to procreative choice clearly includes the right to de-
cide whether to bear or beget children. Whether the Constitution protects broad
procreative choices, such as the right to choose the method of procreation, is unclear.
See generally John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405,420-36 (1993) (discussing the scope of
reproductive freedom in light of new conceptive techniques).
16. See infra part II.A.
17. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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Court limits its definition of a burden or penalty to government dep-
rivation of a constitutional, common law, or statutory entitlement
to the exercise of the right.' 8 In contrast, a mere government re-
fusal to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not in-
fringe upon the right and is subject only to the minimal rational
relations constitutional scrutiny ordinarily accorded government
economic action.19 The Supreme Court considers a simple govern-
ment decision not to pay for the individual's exercise of the funda-
mental right as a rights-neutral exercise of legitimate
governmental discretion to distribute scarce societal resources. 2 0
18. See discussion of the Supreme Court's negative rights approach to constitu-
tional rights infra part II.B. See generally CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTI-
TTION 68-92 (1993) (arguing strongly against this "deprivation of an entitlement"
approach to defining rights, which Professor Sunstein calls "status quo neutrality").
19. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471-74 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 315-18 (1980); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 478-80, 486-87 (1970); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices, 492 U.S. 490, 507-11 (1989) (holding in part that the state may constitutionally
prohibit abortions at publicly funded hospitals on the ground that such a prohibition
is not a burden on the right to an abortion, even though it may significantly reduce
the number of facilities at which women may obtain abortions).
20. Classic examples of this view are the Supreme Court's contrasting decisions
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and the Medicaid abortion funding cases,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In each
case, the Supreme Court addressed state decisions that denied benefits to individu-
als because of their exercise of a constitutional right. However, the Supreme Court's
resolution of these cases differs sharply. In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that a
state decision to exclude a Seventh Day Adventist from eligibility for unemployment
compensation because she refused to work on Saturday, her religious sabbath, was
unconstitutional because it burdened or penalized her First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion by depriving her of unemployment compensation, which she
otherwise would have been entitled to, as the cost for following her faith. 374 U.S. at
403-06. In contrast, in Harris and Maher the Supreme Court held that a statute
that excluded abortion, but not childbirth, from Medicaid funding did not burden or
penalize a Medicaid recipient for exercising her constitutional right to choose abor-
tion, but was merely a government decision not to fund the abortion, to which she
had no preexisting entitlement. See Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (upholding Hyde Amend-
ment which excluded medically necessary abortions from Medicaid funding); Maher,
432 U.S. 398 (upholding Connecticut regulation which excluded non-medically nec-
essary abortions from Medicaid funding). The Court in Harris and Maher distin-
guished Sherbert on the ground that in Sherbert the claimant had been denied
eligibility for all unemployment compensation if she refused to violate her sabbath,
whereas the conditions in Harris and Maher had simply refused to fund the Medi-
caid recipient's abortion, but had not denied her eligibility for other Medicaid fund-
ing. The latter, the Court stated, would have been a burden or penalty on the right
analogous to that in Sherbert; the former was simply a refusal to pay for the exercise
of the constitutional right. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19. The fact that the govern-
ment's refusal to fund her exercise of the constitutional right, as a practical matter,
deprived her of the ability to obtain an abortion was irrelevant. The state had no
positive constitutional obligation, the Court held, to fund her exercise of her consti-
tutional right to choose to have an abortion. Id. at 318. Thus, the Supreme Court's
view, as reflected in these cases, sharply distinguishes state benefit policies that the
Court determines "penalize" or "injure" someone for exercising a constitutional right
1995]
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As applied to family cap plans, this view suggests that because
these plans only refuse to support additional children, they are
merely rights-neutral government decisions not to "pay for" a pro-
creative choice to have a child. The plans do not deprive welfare
recipients of any pre-existing property rights or disqualify them
from eligibility for other welfare benefits.21 Nevertheless, they are
effectively government oversight of a welfare recipient's procreative
choices through the simple expedient of reducing subsistence wel-
fare payments for state-disfavored procreative choices. 22
from those in which the state simply decides not to "fund" or "pay for" the exercise of
a right.
21. See supra note 20.
22. A recent district court decision that is apparently the first decided case to
address the legality of family cap plans supports this conclusion. C.K. v. Shalala,
883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995). The court held that the New Jersey plan was consti-
tutional after it concluded that the New Jersey family cap did not unduly burden or
penalize welfare recipients by, for example, reducing aid to welfare recipients on the
birth of a child. Id. at 1014-15. The court also held that the New Jersey plan com-
plied with federal statutes and that the Department of Health and Human Services
waiver necessary to circumvent contrary federal law was properly granted. Id. at
1005-08.
Scholars have extensively criticized the Supreme Court's formulation of the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine, in particular its burden/subsidy approach to de-
termining whether government benefit and funding conditions violate constitutional
rights. See discussion of scholarship infra part III. Formulated first at the turn of
the century to assess governmental conditions on the extension of benefits to busi-
ness and corporate interests and later used to assess conditions on federal grants to
states and local authorities, in recent years the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
has most often been used to address the constitutionality of government funding and
benefit conditions that affect the exercise of individual rights. See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. Rav. 593 (1990);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989)
(critiquing the history of, and traditional justifications for, the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine). Recent individual rights decisions have been most controversial.
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Lyng v. International Union, 485
U.S. 360 (1988); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). A subcategory of the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine is the question of selective funding. The unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine generally concerns whether the state can condition
government benefits on the surrender of a constitutional right; the selective funding
issue addresses specifically whether government funding may discriminate against
the exercise of a constitutional right. The absolute form of the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine would forbid government to ever award a benefit on a condition that,
if directly imposed, would violate a constitutional right. However, this absolute posi-
tion is never defended in the scholarly literature and has never been the law. See
generally discussion infra part I1; Sullivan, supra, at 1415-1417. Adherence to the
'absolute" position would invalidate most government benefit programs, which gen-
erally include a host of conditions that potentially infringe constitutional rights. See
generally Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution,
39 STAN. L. REv. 1103 (1987). For example, a government decision to fund prenatal
care arguably disadvantages the procreative rights of those who choose not to bear
children or who choose to adopt children, because the funding benefits only those
who exercise their constitutional choice to bear a child and thus need prenatal care.
Thus, the judicial and scholarly challenge is to distinguish between permissible and
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This article, in the context of welfare family cap or child limi-
tation proposals, addresses whether, once the government under-
takes a subsistence welfare program, it may constitutionally
exclude welfare families from available funding on the basis of their
constitutionally protected procreative choices. This article argues
that such rights-based exclusions from funding harm the welfare
recipient solely because she has exercised her constitutional right
in a manner disfavored by government. Such express rights-based
government harm to an individual should presumptively violate her
right to procreate, just as would government harm by a direct fine
or penalty for the exercise of the right.23
Accordingly, this article criticizes Supreme Court doctrine
that categorically immunizes from constitutional scrutiny rights-
based government-imposed harm, by treating it as a government
refusal to subsidize or fund a constitutional right. This Supreme
Court approach is inherently unprincipled and improperly opens a
back door to the use of unbridled government power to attack im-
portant constitutional rights that otherwise would be strongly pro-
tected. Ordinarily, the Court protects persons from rights-based
government harm when that harm is a so-called fine, burden, or
penalty on the procreative choice. In contrast, the Supreme Court,
by permitting government funding which conditions benefit levels
on recipients' abandonment of their constitutional rights, irration-
ally permits government to similarly harm those dependent upon
government aid and thus jeopardizes their procreative choices.
Instead, such government harm by refusal to subsidize a con-
stitutional right should violate the right if the refusal to subsidize is
defined by rights-based, rather than rights-neutral, criteria. There
is no principled reason for treating express rights-based harm by
denial of funding differently than express rights-based harm by fine
or penalty. In both cases the government attacks the constitutional
impermissible rights-disadvantaging benefit conditions. That the benefit condition
disadvantages a right does not necessarily mean that the condition is
unconstitutional.
23. This article does not seek to resolve the general debate about the wisdom of
the Supreme Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine in toto. This article also
does not address the related question of whether the Constitution provides a "posi-
tive right" to government funding of certain subsistence human needs. An example
of this argument, that the Constitution may include some "positive" rights to govern-
ment funding, is set forth in SUNSTE N, supra note 18 (arguing that the Constitution
should be interpreted to provide a constitutional right for government funding of
abortions for indigent women who become pregnant as a result of rape or incest).
See also Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1985)
(arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted to provide Constitutional rights
to funding for some essential subsistence needs).
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right by harming individuals because of their exercise of the
right.24 Accordingly, such harm by denial of aid should be equally
violative of the constitutional right.25 Because these welfare family
cap proposals do not satisfy this standard, they should be held
unconstitutional. 26
This article argues that constitutional analysis of welfare ben-
efit conditions should take into account harm imposed upon welfare
recipients by rights-based denial of funding. Part I details current
family cap plans. Part II examines the constitutionality of these
plans under current doctrine by examining the right to decide to
bear or beget children and the Supreme Court's distinction between
negative and positive rights. Scholarly commentary on the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine is outlined and critiqued in Part III.
Part IV argues for a new harm-based analysis of government fund-
ing decisions based on the exercise of constitutional rights. Finally,
Part V applies the proposed analysis to family cap proposals.
I. Current Welfare Child Limitation Plans
Family cap plans are an increasingly popular form of so-called
welfare reform. The plans generally deny new birth benefit in-
creases for children born or conceived while the mother is receiving
Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC).27 Arkansas, 28 Georgia,29
New Jersey,3o and Wisconsin 3' were the four earliest states to
24. See discussion infra part IV.C.
25. An exception would be if government must make rights-based funding alloca-
tions because of the nature of the funding decision or if the rights-based funding
decision is otherwise justified by a compelling governmental interest. See discussion
infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
26. See discussion infra part V.
27. Such programs currently require federal waivers of current AFDC require-
ments by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
These states all received federal waivers before December 1, 1994. Subsequently,
Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, and Nebraska have also received federal waivers for
welfare reforms including family caps. See ADMIN. FOR CIm. REN AND FAMILIES,
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, WELFARE REFORM: SECTION 1115 WAIVER
AUTHORITY, at 1, 3, 17, 18 (June 1, 1995).
28. See Aim FAMILY ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 10000, 10110 (1994).
29. See generally GA. CODE Ann. § 49-4-115 (1994); GEORGIA DEP'T OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, GEORGIA PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILrrY AND RESPONSmILITY PROJECT, Ap-
plication for Waiver, Research and Demonstration Project [hereinafter GA. WAIVER
REQUEST], 11-4, 5 (June 14, 1993).
30. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-3.5, 3.6 (West 1992). This New Jersey plan
was recently upheld by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of New
Jersey. C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995). See supra note 22.
31. See generally STATE OF WISCONSIN, SUMMARY, WISCONSIN WELFARE REFORM
(June, 1994).
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adopt such welfare programs. Subsequently, several other states
have passed32 or introduced33 legislation to do the same.
Currently, the state plans require a waiver of existing federal
welfare statutes. 3 4 However, legislation currently proposed in the
United States Congress could make family cap plans a requirement
of federal law.35 President Bill Clinton's federal welfare reform
32. Several states have adopted statutes that provide for AFDC family caps. To
become effective, these provisions require federal waivers of conflicting federal law.
See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-292(C) (Supp. 1994) (denying AFDC benefits not only
to additional children born to welfare recipients, but also to former recipients' chil-
dren born up to five years after the family had voluntarily left welfare); 1995 Ind. S.
Enrolled A. 478, in part adding Ind. Code 12-14-2.53 (approved by Governor, May 4,
1995) (Indiana would deny cash benefits to children born more than 10 months after
the family qualifies for AFDC); 1995 Ill. S. 110, 89th General Assembly, in part
adding 305 Il. C. S. 5:4.2 (F) (approved by Governor, Mar. 6, 1995) (Illinois would
deny AFDC recipients any increase for a child born while the family was receiving
aid); 1995 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 5, § 110 (approved by Governor Feb. 10, 1995)
(Massachusetts would deny any incremental assistance for additional children born
to AFDC recipients); 1995 Texas H. R. 1863, amending in part Texas H.R.C.
§ 31.3003 (approved by Governor, June 13, 1995) (Texas would deny to welfare recip-
ients with two or more children additional cash assistance for any child whose pa-
ternity has not been established or who was born more than ten months after the
recipient's date of eligibility; however, the recipient would be able to retain more
earned income); see also 1995 Neb. Adv. Legis. Serv. 455; 1994 Miss. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 22; 1994 Kan. Adv. Legis. Serv. 359; 1995 Md. Adv. Legis. Serv. 491; 1995 Va.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 450.
33. Other states have introduced family cap legislation. See, e.g., 1994 Colo. H.
R. 1237; 1993 Del. H. R. 366; 1993 Fla. H. R. 1023, § (aX); 1993 La. H.R. 759; 1995
Pa. H. R. 2; 1993 S.C. H. R. 3207; 1994 Utah S. 294. California included such a
proposal in a general voter ballot initiative which was defeated in the November
1992 election. See MARCH FONG Eu, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF CALIFOR-
NIA, CALIFoRNI BALLOr PAMPHLET 46-50, 72-79 (1992). This proposal would have
refused to increase eligible family size "for a child who was conceived while either
the father or the mother of the child was receiving aid." Id. at 74. See also Carla
Rivera, Coalition Opposes Welfare Cutback, L.A. TzEws, Apr. 4, 1992, at B2.
94. See generaLy 42 U.S.C. j IU5 (19941.
35. See Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 3. The bill, which was passed by
the House of Representatives on March 24, 1995, would convert most federal welfare
entitlements into "block grants," i.e., lump sums, which the states could distribute
under their own welfare program. The House bill expressly prohibits a state from
using any portion of the federal grant to provide "cash benefits for a minor child born
to a recipient of benefits" who "received such benefits at any time during the ten
month period ending with the birth of the child." The provision would not apply to
children born as the result of rape or incest. The Act would additionally deny aid to
unwed mothers under eighteen years of age. The bill specifically states that its pur-
pose is to "promote work and marriage" and to "discourage out-of-wedlock births."
Id. § 101. The bill also requires states to take action to "reduce the incidence of out-
of-wedlock pregnancies" and "reduce teenage pregnancies." Id. § 101 (adding § 402
(a)(1)(F), (G) to Title IV of the Social Security Act). The House legislation addition-
ally provides an incentive to states to reduce the numbers of illegitimate births by
increasing the amount of block grants to states that do so. The Senate version of the
bill, which was passed by the Senate on September 19, 1995, expressly permits, but
does not require states to deny aid to children born to welfare recipients and thus
leaves this decision to the states. See The Work Opportunity Act of 1995, § 406(c),
H.R.4 (Senate), 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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proposal, the proposed Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, also
would have expressly authorized states to "limit welfare benefit in-
creases when children are conceived by parents on AFDC."36
Of the four states that first adopted such plans, the Arkansas,
Wisconsin, and New Jersey family cap requirements are currently
at least partially in effect.3 7 The Georgia family cap is scheduled to
go into effect in 1996 and applies to persons receiving welfare for at
least twenty-four months after January 1, 1994.38 The first Wis-
consin program was a five year pilot program called the Parental
and Family Responsibility Demonstration Project (PFR), which ap-
plied only to a limited target population (primarily teenage parents)
in certain Wisconsin counties. 39 Wisconsin has subsequently
adopted a "Work Not Welfare" proposal that also includes a child
limitation proposal.40 Most recently, Wisconsin adopted a state-
wide AFDC Benefit Cap program, which would eliminate the addi-
tional birth increment for children born to welfare recipients on or
after November 1, 1996. 4 1
36. SUMMARY, WORK & RESPONSmLrY Act, supra note 2, at 35-36. The proposal
would require states to permit welfare recipients to earn back the reduced benefits
through increased work income.
37. The Arkansas plan went into effect July 1, 1994. See ARK- FAMILY ASSIST-
ANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, § 10100. The Wisconsin plan was scheduled to go into
effect as a pilot program in four counties on July 1, 1994. See WISCONSIN DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, PARENTAL AND FAMILY RESPONSInBIIL DEMONSTRA-
TION PROJECT, APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 64-67 (Mar. 31, 1993) [herein-
after Wisc. DEMONSTRATION PRo.]. The New Jersey plan began on October 1, 1992.
See BULLETIN, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FAMILY
DEVELOPMENT, FAMILY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter N.J. FAMILY
DEV. PRo.] (eliminating the automatic entitlement to incrementally increased pub-
lic assistance benefits as a result of the birth of a child in accordance with the statu-
tory provision of P. L. 1991, c.52 6 ); PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, DIVISION OF ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL, FAMILY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, EXCLU-
SIONS FROM THE ELIGIBLE UNIT, STEPPARENTS, AFDC-N PAYMENT STANDARD EQUALi-
ZATION, 24 N.J.R. 2147, §§ 10:81-3.8(a), (c), 14.18(a)1i4, (e)liii (June 15, 1992)
[hereinafter N.J. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FAMILY DEV. PROJ.].
38. See GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-115 (1994). The elimination of the benefit incre-
ment does not apply to children conceived as a result of rape or incest.
39. See Wisc. DEMONSTRATION PRod., supra note 37, at 11-14. The Wisconsin
Parental And Family Responsibility Initiative Project (PFR) began July 1, 1994, as a
pilot program in Juneau, Milwaukee, Oneida, and Rock Counties in Wisconsin. Id.
at 57-67.
40. See WISCONSIN DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, WORK NOT WELFARE
DEMONSTRATION PRoJEcT 8, 13-14 (July 12, 1993) (amended Nov. 1993) [hereinafter
Wisc. WORK NoT WELFARE PROJ.]. This program went into effect January 1, 1995.
41. See WISCONSIN DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, AFDC BENEFIT CAP
(ABC) DEMONSTRATION PROJEC 10-13 (Jan. 31, 1994) [hereinafter Wisc. ABC
PRo.]. A waiver for this project was awarded by HHS in June of 1994. See Letter
from Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, to Gerald
Whitburn, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (June 24,
1994) (on file with the Law & Inequality Journal). The cap was recently approved by
the Wisconsin state legislature and applies to children born on or after November 1,
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According to the State of Wisconsin, the PFR plan is designed
to promote families by removing disincentives in the welfare system
that may discourage young couples from marrying and working.4
2
The Wisconsin PFR plan reduces the normal benefit increase for
additional children by half when a second child is born and elimi-
nates the increase entirely for the third child and subsequent chil-
dren.43 The plan permits working welfare recipients to "earn back'
some of the lost benefits by increasing the "earned income disre-
gards."44 The earned income disregard provides that certain lim-
ited amounts of earned income may be disregarded in calculating
welfare recipient income for purposes of determining welfare eligi-
bility, and thus permits working recipients to earn more money yet
still remain eligible for welfare. Thus, if a person whose income
exceeds $6,000 per year is ineligible for welfare, the "income disre-
gard" permits the recipient to "disregard" certain earned income in
determining whether her total income exceeds $6,000.
In contrast to the limited geographical applicability of the
Wisconsin PFR pilot program, the New Jersey plan is a legislative
revision of the New Jersey AFDC program that applies state-wide.
The New Jersey statute eliminates any increase in benefits that
would otherwise be paid on the birth of an additional child, if the
child is born while the family is receiving AFDC.45 Like the Wis-
consin pilot program, the New Jersey act attempts to offset the re-
cipients' loss in income from the family cap requirement by
increasing the earned income disregards for eligible AFDC fami-
lies.4 6 However, earned income disregards benefit only families in
which members are able to find work. If the recipient cannot find
work or is unable to work, e.g., because of inability to get adequate
1996. See 1995 Wis. Adv. Legis. Serv. 12, §§ 4, 5 (West) (enacted May 15, 1995). The
cap exempts cases of rape or incest, children conceived while the family was tempo-
rarily not receiving benefits, the first child of a dependent child, and children not
residing with their biological parents. The statute also authorizes additional exemp-
tions by administrative rule.
42. Wisc. DEMONSTRATION PRoJ., supra note 37, at 1-2. In addition to expanding
eligibility for welfare to include married teenage couples, the plan increases the
earned income disregard for pilot couples and requires teen parents to participate in
comprehensive education and employment related services. Id. at 20.
43. Under this program, the maximum monthly benefit payment for single par-
ents subject to the program would be $440 for a one-child family and $479 for a two
or more child family, as opposed to a previous monthly maximum benefit of $517 for
two children and $617 for three children; a similar policy applies to two-parent fami-
lies, but has higher maximum benefit levels. Id. at 19. The proposal does permit
AFDC recipients to keep additional work income. Id.
44. Id. at 20-22.
45. N. J. REV. STAT. § 44:10-3.5 (1993).
46. Id. § 44:10-3.6 (1993).
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child care, she has no earned income to offset the reduction in sub-
sistence welfare payments.47
The Arkansas and Georgia welfare family cap requirements
are less developed than the Wisconsin and New Jersey proposals.
The Arkansas plan would exclude from eligibility for additional
cash AFDC benefits, otherwise payable on the birth of an additional
child, any child conceived or born while the mother is receiving
AFDC benefits.48 The plan excludes children born as a result of
rape, incest, or failed contraception, although the child is included
in the family unit for other allocation purposes, including Medicaid
coverage, child support enforcement requirements, and resource or
income eligibility.49 The Georgia plan also excludes births due to
verifiable rape or incest. The plan applies only to long-term welfare
recipients, defined as any family that has received AFDC cash ben-
efits for a total of twenty-four months after January 1, 1994.50
Such families cannot receive an incremental increase in AFDC cash
benefits because of the birth of an additional child; although the
excluded child remains eligible for child support and Medicaid
payments.
In each state, family cap policies are part of general packages
labelled welfare reform. The particular policies are specifically
designed to influence the childbearing and lifestyle choices of wo-
men who are on welfare, which are otherwise constitutionally pro-
tected.51 For example, the Wisconsin PFR pilot program
specifically states that two of its goals are to reduce the number of
children born to teenage welfare mothers and to promote marriage
among pregnant teenagers. 52 Similarly, the New Jersey program is
expressly designed to influence the moral and value choices of wel-
fare recipients. The New Jersey proposal's stated goal is to en-
courage "responsible choices" by welfare recipients and change
welfare policy to be more consistent with "mainstream values."53
47. Both New Jersey and Wisconsin do provide limited child care allotments.
See NEw JERSEY Fmnmy DEVELOPMENT PR OGRAM (FDP) MAIu, § 10.86-10, 1-2
[hereinafter N.J. FAMmY DEV. PROGRAM MASuAL]; 1995 Wisc. Adv. Legis. Serv. 8,
§ 49.193(8Xa) (providing approximately $100 per week); 1995 Wis. Adv. Legis. Serv.
8, §§ 46.98(4)(d), 49.193(8)(a) (authorizing counties to set rate at an amount no less
than that charged by at least 75% of the child care providers in the county).
48. AyK. FAMILY ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 10110, 10111(1). Unlike
the other states, this proposal appears to exclude only children of mothers receiving
AFDC and not of fathers receiving AFDC.
49. Id. §§ 10110, 10112, 10113, 10116.
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-115 (1994).
51. See infra part 11.A.
52. See Wisc. DEMONSTRATION PROj., supra note 37, at 1.
53. See WArVER REQUEST, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FAmIY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
6-11. The rhetoric of the New Jersey plan emphasizes breaking the cycle of poverty
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The proposed federal legislation adopting family caps is also
based upon moral and value judgments about procreative choices.
For example, the express purpose of the bill passed by the House of
Representatives is to promote marriage and reduce illegitimacy.
The welfare reform bill states that marriage is "the foundation of a
successful society" and an "essential social institution," and that a
goal of the w elfare program is "promoting work and marriage ad
discourag[ing] out of wedlock births."54
These policies handicap welfare recipients by denying their
children eligibility for welfare, even though the children would have
been eligible if born to non-recipients. Family cap policies substi-
tute the government's own model of appropriate behavior for that of
the welfare recipient, and accordingly substitute the government's
value choice concerning childbearing for that of the individual. The
question that thus arises is whether it is appropriate for the gov-
ernment to intrude into the childbearing choices of poor women
merely because they are dependent upon government aid.
I. The Constitutionality of Family Cap Plans under
Current Doctrine
Family cap proposals are probably constitutional under cur-
rent Supreme Court doctrine. The primary argument against con-
stitutionality is that the plans violate welfare recipients'
fundamental constitutional right to procreative choice because they
condition welfare benefit levels on the recipients' childbearing
choices.55 That is, the plans expressly give proportionately more
and encouraging recipient choice. However, the methods that it uses seem designed
neither to reduce poverty nor to enhance recipient choice, but to manipulate recipi-
ent choice by puenaing ripiet choices unAccetahbe to the prograiu planners. See
N.J. FAMILY DEv. PROGRAM MA1fuAL, supra note 47, § 10:86-8.1-8.10. Similarly, the
Georgia program states as a goal encouraging "wise" child-bearing decisions, GA.
WAIVER REQUEST, supra note 29, at II-1, and seeks to test whether the benefit cap
enhances "parental responsibility," and whether parents who are subject to benefit
caps are less likely to have children than those who are subject to the family cap. Id.
at 111-3. Likewise, the objective of the Arkansas plan is to "examine factors affecting
individual choice and family self-sufficiency" including evaluating whether removing
the AFDC benefit increment for additional births will reduce the number of births.
See Letter from Mary Jo Bane, Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, to
Thomas Dalton, Director of Arkansas Department of Human Services (Apr. 5, 1994)
(on file with the Law & Inequality Journal), at p. 7.
54. See Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 3, §§ 100 (1), (2), 101.
55. See generally Davis, supra note 11 (arguing that these proposals are uncon-
stitutionally coercive); Bomersbach, supra note 11 (challenging the legality of the
New Jersey family cap plan under the New Jersey State Constitution and interna-
tional human rights law). For discussions of the related issue of Norplant welfare
bonuses, see Jeanne L. Vance, Womb for Rent: Norplant and the Undoing of Poor
Women, 21 HASTiNGS CONST. L. Q. 827 (1994) (arguing that proposals to pay welfare
recipients to use Norplant unconstitutionally coerce and penalize their exercise of
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future welfare benefits to parents who postpone childbearing until
they leave the welfare rolls than to those who have children while
receiving welfare.56 Nevertheless, although the Supreme Court has
clearly held that the decision to bear or beget children is part of a
defined fundamental right to privacy protected by the Constitu-
tion, 57 under current doctrine the Supreme Court would probably
hold that these plans do not violate a recipient's constitutional right
because they do not prohibit, burden, or penalize that right, but
rather constitute permissible government refusals to subsidize the
right.58
A. The Constitutional Right to Decide Whether to Bear or
Beget Children
The Supreme Court has clearly established that the right to
decide whether to bear or beget children is part of an individual's
constitutionally protected fundamental right of privacy. The Court
grounded the right in the general due process protection of the free-
dom to make intimate decisions concerning family life, including
decisions regarding contraception, abortion, and childbearing.59
Accordingly, government intrusions upon the right are traditionally
subject to strict scrutiny and are thus permissible only if narrowly
rights to bear children and to choose their method of contraception); Linda M. Mer-
ritt, Birth Control Incentives for Welfare Mothers, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171
(1993-94) (arguing that government financial incentives to welfare recipients to use
Norplant coerce their procreative rights and should be subject to strict scrutiny);
Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine and Mandating Nor-
plant for Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 15 (1994) (arguing
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should apply to legislation that man-
dates Norplant use as a condition of receiving welfare benefits).
An argument that these plans violate the Equal Protection Clause because they
discriminate against different classes of welfare recipients, i.e., those who have chil-
dren while receiving welfare and those whose children were born while the family
was not receiving welfare, is likely precluded by Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970), which held that legislative welfare benefit allocations were subject gener-
ally to the minimal judicial scrutiny accorded economic regulation. See infra notes
81-85 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
57. See discussion infra part II.A.
58. The decision of the first case to address the legality of these plans is consis-
tent with this conclusion. In C.K v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995), a New
Jersey federal district court judge upheld New Jersey's child limitation cap against
both constitutional and statutory challenges. See discussion supra note 22.
59. See, e.g., Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (defining protected
liberty interest under the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause to include individ-
ual's interest in private matters such as marriage and child rearing); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating state law which authorized the forced
sterilization of "habitual criminals"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(invalidating state law outlawing contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(outlawing government prohibition of abortion "pre-viability").
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tailored to further a compelling state interest.60 The Supreme
Court has struck down state statutes authorizing forced steriliza-
tion of criminals,61 banning or restricting access to contraception,6 2
and prohibiting abortion.63 The Supreme Court has upheld state
restrictions on the right to decide whether to bear or beget children
primarily in the abortion cases based upon the state's considerable
interest in protecting life. Yet even here the Supreme Court upheld
only limited government restrictions on the right to an abortion.64
60. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 684-91 (1977) (holding
that state contraceptive restrictions were not supported by compelling governmental
interest and thus violated constitutional privacy right of prospective contraceptive
users); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy included
the right of pregnant women to abortion, subject to strict scrutiny). Cf. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), in which a majority of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, while affirming Roe, rejected its traditionally formulated strict
scrutiny standard as applied to the right to have an abortion. Instead, the most
rights-protective justices in this majority group substituted a lesser standard that
permitted the state to constitutionally regulate abortion to protect the state's "im-
portant and legitimate interests" provided that the state did not unduly interfere
'iith the right to abortion. by imposig an "undue bnrden" or abtniu btTe
that would impede the woman's right to an abortion. Id. at 2818-21. This decision
might be read broadly to substitute this significantly more liberal "legitimate inter-
ests" standard for strict scrutiay analysis of rights to privacy, including not only
abortion rights, but other procreative rights such as the right to bear and beget
children. However, a narrower interpretation of Casey seems warranted by the pe-
culiar milieu surrounding abortion rights discourse, including the strength of the
state's interest in protecting human life and, in particular, the volatility of the divi-
sive social battle concerning abortion. Accordingly, Casey's formulation of the "un-
due burden" test might be read to strategically steer a middle course through the
abortion thicket by protecting the essential right to abortion formulated in Roe,
while leaving room for the state to, as Justice O'Connor stated, "express profound
respect for the life of the unbora" provided that the state does not erect a "substan-
tial obstacle" to the woman's exercise of the right to choose. Id. at 2821. Under this
view of the case, the state's "pre-viability" interest, although not sufficiently compel-
ling to support prohibition of abortion, can be seen as sufficiently strong to support
moderate regulation of the right to abortion. Read in this tactical light, Casey is
much easier to reconcile with the long line of fundamental rights cases outside of the
abortion context, which have consistently applied a strong standard to analyzing
burdens on the right to bear or beget children. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-91;
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
See also Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447-49 (1993) (refusing to extend "family
privacy" fundamental rights to include right of juvenile aliens to non-institutional-
ized care in the custody of those other than parents or legal guardians, but acknowl-
edging that traditional strict scrutiny's "compelling interest" standard applied to
such fundamental rights).
61. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding state statute unconstitutional
that authorized forced sterilization of "habitual criminals"). Cf Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1926) (permitting forced sterilization of mental patients).
62. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
63. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (upholding,
inter alia, 24-hour waiting period prior to abortion, while striking husband notifica-
tion rule); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding
state law requiring physicians to test for viability prior to performing abortion); Ohio
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In circumstances other than the decision to abort, the Court has
rarely recognized any state interest as sufficient to justify restrict-
ing the individual's childbearing decisions.65 Obviously, the state's
interest in protecting life would not justify governmental restric-
tions on an individual's decision to bear children. Government re-
strictions on decisions to bear children burden rather than advance
the state interest in protecting life. Other lesser government inter-
ests, such as the state's interests in protecting security and deter-
ring crime, are sometimes asserted to support sterilization or
contraception restrictions. 66 However, these interests also rarely
pass muster, except in the context of persons considered to have
less constitutional protection, such as convicted persons,6 7 prison-
ers,68 or in some cases the mentally incompetent.6 9
Accordingly, a government welfare plan that simply forbids
welfare mothers to have children while receiving welfare would vio-
late welfare mothers' fundamental constitutional right to bear chil-
dren. Such a plan might not be as intrusive as forced sterilization
of welfare recipients and would only apply during the limited dura-
tion of a mother's status as a welfare beneficiary, yet even such a
limited prohibition on the childbearing rights of a welfare mother
would infringe upon her fundamental right to decide whether to
bear children. Such a plan would be subjected to heightened scru-
tiny, under which the supporting interests that the government
might assert, such as an interest in lowering welfare costs or in en-
forcing the government's standards of moral decency or responsibil-
ity, would not justify the plan's impairment of welfare mothers'
right to bear and beget children.70
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding parental
notification requirement for minors who wish to have abortions); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking
down various regulatory abortion control requirements).
65. Childbearing restrictions are distinguishable from government restrictions
on the right to rear children, where the protection of the right may be weaker. See
Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
66. See, e.g., People v. Negrete, 629 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (invalidating
criminal sentence where sentencing judge had extended jail term to prevent defend-
ant from becoming pregnant).
67. See, e.g., Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One Step Forward or Two
Steps Back, 16 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 139 (1993) (addressing use of Norplant as a con-
dition of probation).
68. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding the
authority of prisons to refuse an inmate permission to artificially inseminate his
wife).
69. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Re-
productive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806.
70. Similar state interests failed to justify even lesser restrictions on procreative
rights, such as the right to purchase or sell contraceptives. For example, in Carey v.
Population Services, the Court refused to recognize arguments that state interests in
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Moreover, even as to funding decisions, the government proba-
bly could not constitutionally eliminate welfare recipients' right to
all benefits or even reduce recipients' prior entitlement on the birth
of an additional child. Supreme Court doctrine provides that the
government may not burden or penalize the exercise of a funda-
mental right, even if the government does not prohibit the exercise
of the right altogether. For example, the state may not impose im-
proper regulatory requirements upon the right,71 or, as applied to
funding decisions, completely deny persons eligibility for govern-
ment entitlements because of the exercise of the right.72 Under this
health, potential life, or deterring illicit sexual activity by minors justified burdens
on the right of the public, including minors, to purchase contraceptives, which at
best only weakly advanced these interests. 431 U.S. at 686-90. Accord Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1971) (holding that
given the individual's strong interest in marriage and procreation, the state's inter-
est in deterring crime did not justify a sterilization statute that authorized steriliza-
tion of habitual larceners, but not embezzlers, particularly where there was no
scientific basis to conclude that larceners were more likely to have criminal children
than embezzlers). These cases establish the principle that the mere assertion of a
government interest in impairing the right to bear or beget children does not justify
government regulation. Rather, the interest must be compelling and strongly ad-
vanced by the particular provision at issue. Obviously, governmental interests in
lowering welfare costs or, worse yet, simply deterring childbearing by poor women,
would not justify outright government prohibition of childbearing by welfare recipi-
ents. Neither economic, cost-saving interests nor hostility to the right itself justify
infringing upon constitutional procreative rights. An argument might be made that
some of these statutes that apply to teenage welfare mothers may be justified by a
governmental purpose to deter pregnancy by teens who may have lesser procreative
rights than adults. However, the Constitution also protects the right of teens to
make procreative decisions. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (affirming line of cases recognizing minors' constitutionally protected abortion
rights, although permitting limited parental notification or consent requirements,
with judicial bypass provisions); Hodgson v. Hodgson, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (striking
down two-parent abortion notification requirement).
71. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (overturning a state statute which per-
mitted only licensed pharmacists to sell contraceptives). The Supreme Court argued
that the requirement limited public access to contraception and thus imposed an
unconstitutional burden on the right to use contraceptives, even though the statute
did not prohibit use of contraceptives. Id. at 689. Similarly, in Casey, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that undue burdens, short of outright prohibition of the right to
bear or beget children, are constitutionally problematic. 112 S.Ct. at 2819.
72. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding one-year residency
requirement for welfare eligibility to be unconstitutional burden on the right to
travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state's denial of unem-
ployment compensation to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday,
her sabbath, violated her First Amendment free exercise rights). The Court in these
cases concluded that the denial of government benefits constituted an unconstitu-
tional burden or penalty on the right. However, in subsequent cases such as Maher
v. Roe, the Court limited these earlier decisions to apply to deprivation of recipient's
entitlement benefits. 432 U.S. at 474 n.8. In contrast, the Court held that the denial
of benefits to which the recipient was not otherwise entitled, i.e., a so-called refusal




view, depriving welfare recipients of eligibility for all support or re-
ducing benefit payments upon the birth of a child would burden the
exercise of the right, and thus would violate the right.73
B. Negative versus Positive Procreative Rights
1. The Supreme Court's Concept of Negative Rights
Under traditional fundamental rights analysis, the govern-
ment could not constitutionally forbid people, whether welfare re-
cipients or not, from having children or otherwise penalize them for
having additional children by eliminating or reducing their welfare
entitlement. However, current Supreme Court doctrine suggests
that the government may indirectly influence or encourage the wel-
fare recipient to choose not to have additional children by refusing
to fund the additional child.
The Supreme Court considers the Bill of Rights to be primarily
a charter of negative rights, that is, rights against government ac-
tion, rather than positive rights, or rights to particular government
benefits. 74 That is, the Constitution prohibits government action
that violates rights such as free speech or procreative choice, but
does not require the government to affirmatively protect, fund, or
provide the means to exercise the right. Under this view, although
the government constitutionally cannot prohibit, burden, or penal-
ize an individual's constitutional rights, the government is not re-
quired to affirmatively bankroll the rights. Thus, as the Supreme
Court has stated, although an individual may have a fundamental
right to travel, the government does not have to purchase the bus
ticket.75 Of course, the negative rights view does not prohibit the
73. The "undue burden" analysis of Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), should not
alter this analysis since even if Casey applies outside the abortion context, its analy-
sis still recognizes that government burdens upon a fundamental constitutional
right violate the right. See discussion supra note 60.
74. This negative rights view of the Constitution has been subject to considera-
ble criticism with many persons arguing for a more humane interpretation of the
Constitution to provide rights to certain minimal, basic human needs such as food,
shelter and education. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitu-
tional Democracy 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (1979); Dorothy Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan
and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993) (arguing for posi-
tive constitutional right to "information necessary to self-determination"). But see
David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Rights and the Constitution, 53 U. Cm. L.
REv. 864 (1986) (arguing against the interpretation of the Constitution to include
negative rights). My article does not argue that the Constitution includes positive as
well as negative rights, but rather argues that regardless of whether the government
is constitutionally required to fund a particular level of benefits, the Constitution
should still police to some extent the particular distribution of that level of benefits
and, more specifically, the distribution of that level of benefits in a manner that
harms individuals because of the exercise of a constitutionally-protected right.
75. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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government from funding the constitutional rights; rather, the gov-
ernment has the discretion to fund or not to fund.
The government can therefore use its funding discretion to in-
fluence individuals' exercise of their constitutional rights by selec-
tively funding some constitutionally protected choices while
refusing to fund others. Thus, the government may give the indi-
vidual a financial incentive to exercise the right in a government-
favored way. Under the Supreme Court's negative rights interpre-
tation of the Constitution, such selective funding is a permissible
decision to subsidize favored activity and refuse to subsidize disfa-
vored activity, rather than an impermissible burden on, prohibition
of, or penalty on the individual's exercise of constitutional rights.76
For example, in terms of procreative choice, the government gener-
ally may neither prevent an individual from procreating nor require
an individual to procreate, but the government may constitution-
ally influence the individual's procreative choice by selectively
funding government-favored procreative choices.77 As applied to
family cap plans, since the government has no constitutional obliga-
tion to support any child, this view permits the government to deter
childbearing by welfare recipients by refusing to fund their addi-
tional children, even though the government funds children born to
non-recipients.
The apogee of the negative rights view of the Constitution, at
least in the context of governmental decisions to selectively fund
welfare recipients' exercise of procreative rights, is a trilogy of
cases-Dandridge v. Williams,78 Maher v. Roe, 79 and Harris v. Mc-
RaeSO-in which the Court applied this negative rights view to up-
hold government allocations of welfare benefits in a way that
clearly discouraged welfare recipients' free exercise of rights to pro-
creative choice. The Court held that the benefit allocations were
constitutional in that they were mere refusals to subsidize the exer-
cise of a constitutional right.
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Supreme Court upheld a Mary-
land welfare provision that capped welfare benefits at a maximum
lump sum of $250 per month, regardless of family size. 8' Families
76. Although this theory has been widely criticized, the Supreme Court has con-
tinued to affirm it, as recently as the 1991-1992 term. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992).
77. This appears to be an argument that the government's moral interest in en-
forcing ethical values concerning the means used to create life might be a compelling
interest that would justify restricting methods of procreation.
78. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
79. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
80. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
81. 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
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with ten children thus received the same level of benefits as fami-
lies with only three children. Petitioners primarily argued that the
plan violated the equal protection rights of, first, younger children
in a family who received proportionately lesser benefits than older
children in the same family, and second, children in larger families
who received lower per capita benefits than children in smaller
families. 82
The Court, relying upon the negative rights view of the Consti-
tution, concluded that because the government was not obligated to
fund any level of welfare, its decision to allocate proportionately
larger levels of benefits to smaller families than to larger families
was simple economic regulation subject to minimal rational basis
scrutiny and not the deprivation of any constitutional rights,
whether to receive minimal or equal levels of subsistence or to bear
additional children.83
Although Dandridge was argued and decided primarily as an
equal protection case, in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae the
Supreme Court extended the negative rights view of the Constitu-
tion to sanction government allocations of benefits that clearly dis-
advantaged the exercise of a fundamental right, i.e., the woman's
fundamental right to abortion. In both cases the Court held that
82. The Dandridge Court concluded that the poor are not a suspect class. 397
U.S. at 485. Accordingly, the only limitation on the government's allocation of wel-
fare benefits was the minimal rational-basis scrutiny generally accorded economic
regulation. Id. Applying this standard, the Court upheld the Maryland welfare ben-
efits cap as reasonably related to the state's legitimate interest in encouraging em-
ployment, on the view that members of larger families whose economic need was not
fully satisfied by the $250 per month welfare benefit would be encouraged to work.
Id. at 486. (The Maryland policy permitted these families to retain excess earnings.
Id. at 474-75 and n.4). Neither the lack of employable members in many families
nor the obvious discrimination between larger families and smaller families, whose
needs would be more adequately met and thus who would not be subject to the incen-
tive, troubled the Court, which concluded that the State could legitimately decide to
attack part of the problem without "attacking it all." Id. at 486-87.
83. The Maryland statute in Dandridge clearly implicated welfare recipients'
procreative rights by establishing a disincentive for the recipient to have additional
children. By refusing to fund the actual need of larger families, the benefit cap as a
practical matter discouraged larger family sizes. However, the Dandridge Court an-
alyzed the Maryland welfare benefits cap as an equal protection problem and did not
explicitly address the argument that the welfare cap improperly burdened the wel-
fare recipients' exercise of procreative rights by discouraging them from having
larger families or by encouraging them to have smaller families. 397 U.S. at 483-87.
The Maryland cap was not specifically justified as a limitation on the size of welfare
families. Nevertheless, even if this argument had been made it likely would not
have succeeded. The Court's view, articulated in Dandridge, was clearly that the
government had no constitutional obligation to fund the welfare recipients' addi-
tional children and thus was free to refuse funding given merely a plausible reason
for doing so. It is not likely that the Court's view would have changed even if the
Court had considered the argument that the consequence of the government's fund-
ing decision was to discourage welfare recipients' free exercise of procreative rights.
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Congress could, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund
childbirth expenses for Medicaid recipients without also funding
abortions. The Court argued that since under Dandridge the gov-
emnment had the "greater" power, namely to deny any Medicaid
benefits to poor women, the government also had the "lesser" power
to distribute those benefits in a manner that disadvantaged the wo-
man's exercise of a right to abortion.
The Court ignored the fact that such a policy disfavored a wo-
man's constitutionally protected right to have an abortion rather
than carry the child to term.8 4 The Court held that selectively ex-
cluding abortion from Medicaid coverage while funding childbirth
expenses was not unconstitutional direct government regulation or
burdening of a woman's right to abortion. It was merely a govern-
ment refusal to subsidize abortions which, like the welfare cap in
Dandridge, was constitutionally permissible. The fact that the gov-
ernment funded one procreative choice, childbirth, while refusing to
fund the other, abortion, was immaterial. The State was free to use
its benefit disbursing authority as a "carrot" to "encourage" activi-
ties that it found "in the public interest" while discouraging other
activities, even constitutionally protected ones.8 5
2. Impermissible Burdens and Permissible Refusals to
Subsidize
The Court's distinction between benefit allocations that are
impermissible burdens or penalties and those that are permissible
refusals to subsidize is fairly clear. The Supreme Court considers a
government benefits allocation to be a burden or penalty on the ex-
ercise of a constitutional right if the benefit allocation permits indi-
viduals to exercise the constitutional right only by forfeiting either
another constitutional right, a property right,86 or a statutory enti-
tlement to something other than direct funding of the constitutional
right at stake. If, in contrast, the government simply "refuses" to
extend funding to the particular constitutional right at stake and
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
86. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (holding that a state statute that imposed special use tax on large-
scale consumption of newsprint and ink was an unconstitutional discriminatory tax
on newspapers that burdened their First Amendment rights); Arkansas Writers'
Guild v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1989) (holding that a state statute that discrimina-
torily exempted various publications, such as newspapers and religious journals and
trade journals, but not general interest magazines, from sales tax unconstitutionally
burdened the magazines' First Amendment rights).
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does not otherwise require a forfeiture8 7 by the individual as a cost
of exercising the right, the allocation is not a penalty or a burden on
the right, but is merely a permissible refusal to subsidize.88 The
87. The Court excepts government benefits decisions that condition complete eli-
gibility for benefits on the surrender of a constitutional right; thus, the Court appar-
ently concedes that government cannot entirely "cut-off" benefits to welfare
recipients who choose, for example, to have abortions. This, the Court would appar-
ently argue, would "penalize" the exercise of a fundamental right by causing recipi-
ents to completely lose eligibility for benefits because of their exercise of a
constitutional right. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
263 (1974) (striking down a one-year residency requirement for indigents to receive
service in a county hospital). The Maricopa Court held that the denial of all hospital
care to new residents "penalized" their constitutional right to travel). See also Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
88. See, e.g., Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Regan v. Taxa-
tion with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Contrast these cases, in which the Court upheld government selective funding of
speech as permissible refusals to subsidize, with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right to travel), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (right to free
exercise of religion), where the Court struck down government withholding of all
benefit allocations from persons who exercised the constitutional right as a burden
on the right. In the Court's view, the latter cases involved burdens or penalties be-
cause the individual was required to sacrifice an entitlement-eligibility for all
workmen's compensation benefits, Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06, or welfare benefits,
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 642-to exercise the right. In contrast, cases such as Lyng,
Regan, and Rust were permissible refusals to subsidize the right because, unlike
Sherbert and Shapiro, the individual who exercised the right only lost direct govern-
ment funding of the right, not government benefits available for other items. Thus,
the only harm to the individuals, in the Supreme Court's view, was having to pay for
their own constitutional right, a responsibility that, the Court concluded, was the
individuals' anyway. Thus, in Lyng, the Supreme Court held that the legislature's
refusal to give food stamps to striking workers was merely a failure to subsidize
their decision to strike; in Regan, the denial of a tax exemption to organizations
engaged in lobbying was a failure to subsidize lobbying; and in Rust, the denial of
funding to family planning organizations which distributed abortion information
was a failure to subsidize the provision of information about abortion.
Although the Court's standard is fairly clear, its application of that standard to
particular cases has been less than consistent. Compare FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down as a prohibition of constitu-
tionally protected speech a federal statute which forbade publicly funded television
stations from editorializing as a condition of receiving federal funds) with Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding as a permissible refusal to subsidize consti-
tutionally protected speech a federal law which forbade federally-funded family
planning clinics from dispensing information about abortion) and Regan v. Taxation
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding as a permissible refusal to sub-
sidize constitutionally protected speech a federal law that forbade federally tax-ex-
empt nonprofit corporations from lobbying).
In League of Women Voters the Court distinguished the League of Women Voters
public broadcasting statute from the policy at issue in Regan because the League of
Women Voters statute did not expressly permit the federally-funded entities to cre-
ate alternative "alter egos" that could speak in other venues. League of Women Vot-
ers, 468 U.S. at 400. In contrast, the Rust and Regan policies both expressly
permitted the recipients of the federal funds to speak in non-federally funded out-
lets, and thus merely refused to subsidize the speech rather than prohibited it. The
court thus concluded in League of Women Voters that the statute burdened speech
whereas the Rust and Regan policies simply refused to subsidize it. However, this
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Supreme Court's position, pursuant to its negative rights view of
the Constitution, is that the Constitution places few-if any-lim-
its on government's ability to refuse to subsidize the exercise of a
constitutional right, even if government expressly excludes the con-
stitutional right from otherwise available government funding.89
Such refusals to subsidize may in fact substantially harm a recipi-
ent because of her exercise of a constitutional right, but the Court
concludes that such programs are permissible as long as the fund-
ing allocation does not penalize or burden the right.
Under this analysis welfare plans that refuse to fund children
born to welfare recipients while funding children born to non-wel-
fare recipients are constitutionally valid legislative allocations of
government welfare benefits among different classes of welfare re-
cipients. They are subject only to the minimal rational relations
distinction seems non-existent. Because the League of Women Voters statute did not
expressly permit the station owners and employees to create new corporations which
could editorialize in some other venue, it seems illogical to interpret the statute to
prohibit them from doing so. Obviously, owners and employees of federally funded
broadcasting stations, like any one else, can editorialize in other outlets such as
newspapers or other television stations, just as the owners and employees of the
federally funded family planning clinics and nonprofit organizations in Rust and Re-
gan could speak about abortion or lobby elsewhere. If the availability of alternative
venues for speech saves the Rust and Regan speech restrictions, it is unclear why
the equivalent availability of alternative editorializing venues for editorializing in
League of Women Voters did not save the editorializing restrictions, Of course, the
alternative venues to public broadcast stations may have been less adequate substi-
tutes than the alternative venues to family planning clinics or nonprofit organiza-
tions. For example, public broadcasters were unlikely to find other broadcast outlets
to editorialize in, given the relative scarcity of available radio and television sta-
tions. However, the alternative speech venues in Rust and Regan were also argua-
bly lesser substitutes for the established federally supported Rust family planning
clinics and Regan nonprofit organizations, since these existing structures provided
both established tredibfity and aeccess to a peaxinting audience (cli1nic clfients iM
Rust, and organization supporters in Regan).
89. The Court's recent decision in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Uni-
versity of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), may signal a slight retreat from this posi-
tion. In that case, the Court held that the University of Virginia could not
constitutionally exclude a student organization Christian newspaper from funding
which the university extended to other student organization publications. The Court
held that the university was operating a forum for the promotion of diverse view-
points, and thus could not discriminate in that forum on the basis of content. This
decision, on its face, seems inconsistent with Rust v. Sullivan, where the Court held
that the government could exclude speech about abortion from a government funded
family planning clinic. The Court in Rosenberger attempted to distinguish Rust on
the ground that in Rust the government was subsidizing speech to promote its own
point of view and therefore could make content based restrictions, Rosenberger, 115
S.Ct. at 2518-19, whereas in Rosenberger the university was subsidizing diverse
viewpoints and thus could not make content based restrictions. Id. at 2521, 2524-25.
However, it is unclear why this distinction would matter. In both cases, the govern-
ment's funding criteria discriminated against particular speech. It is unclear why
the Rosenberger content discrimination was any worse than the Rust content dis-
crimination (except perhaps because of free exercise of religion considerations).
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scrutiny accorded economic regulation 9O and not to the strict scru-
tiny otherwise applicable to government intrusions on childbearing
choices. The fact that such plans would obviously influence, or even
be designed to influence, the childbearing choices of welfare recipi-
ents would be immaterial on the ground that the plans merely re-
fused to subsidize rather than penalized the woman's childbearing
choices. 9 1
90. See discussion of Dandridge supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
91. Such plans would likely survive rational basis scrutiny since the government
could legitimately argue that it may, in allocating welfare, constitutionally distin-
guish between families with children born before the children became welfare recipi-
ents and families with children born after the families became welfare recipients, on
the grounds that such a classification is reasonably related to the government's in-
terest in encouraging welfare recipients to have fewer children, and thus advances
the government's moral choice to encourage better family planning by welfare
recipients.
There is an additional argument that these welfare benefit plans reflect racial
and gender discrimination since the plans are more likely to apply to women and
persons of color, who are more likely to be AFDC recipients or long-term welfare
recipients, and thus more likely to have children born during the period of welfare
dependency. In contrast, whites, and in particular white males, can obtain jobs more
easily and thus are less likely to be dependent upon welfare, in part because of em-
ployment discrimination against women, blacks, and other persons of color. Also,
once dependent, whites are more likely to quickly leave the welfare rolls than are
persons of color. See Richard Polangin, Employment and Demographic Characteris-
tics of AFDC and Food Stamp Recipients: Executive Summary of a Three-Year Longi-
tudinal Study, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Apr. 1986, at 140-48. This three-year study of
Florida AFDC and Food Stamp recipients found that "long-term" AFDC and Food
Stamp recipients (those continually receiving assistance for three years or longer)
were more likely to be black and female, as compared to both "cyclical" recipients
(those who periodically went on and off public assistance), and short-term recipients.
Similarly, the cyclical public assistance recipients were more likely to be black and
female than the one-shot, short-term recipients, who were more likely to be white
and male. Id. at 1404. Also, long-term public assistance recipients were more likely
to have spottier employment histories than either the cyclical or the short-term re-
cipients. Id.
Also, historically, the family cap proposals cover only AFDC recipients and not
other public assistance programs such as Food Stamps. However, AFDC recipients
are more likely to be people of color than are recipients of other public assistance
programs such as Food Stamps and Supplemental Social Security (SSI). See REPORT
FROM CARMEN D. SOLOMON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (July 13, 1993) (summarizing Social Security Administration data which
indicates that as of 1991, over 60% of AFDC recipients were non-white as compared
to SSI and Food Stamp recipients, of which almost 50% were white (49% for SSI and
46% for Food Stamps in 1991)). This disparity between AFDC recipients and other
public aid recipients is also historically true. Id. (examining data from 1961-1991
which indicates that, historically, AFDC recipients have consisted of proportionately
more minorities than recipients of Food Stamps and SSI).
However, this is a separate analytical issue-whether family cap plans consti-
tute constitutionally invalid race or gender discrimination. Under current doctrine
these plans would probably be analyzed as facially neutral provisions that happen to
disproportionately affect racial minorities, and thus would be unconstitutional only
if one could prove discriminatory legislative intent to disadvantage racial minorities.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally David R. Baron, The
Racially Disparate Impact of Restrictions on the Public Funding of Abortion: An
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3. A Harm-Based Critique of the Supreme Court's
Approach
The very fact that under current doctrine child limitation pro-
posals appear to be constitutional as refusals to subsidize does not
end the inquiry but rather begins it. The facile acceptance of pro-
posals that are specifically designed to sway a dependent welfare
recipient's constitutionally-protected choice to have children, and
that impose substantial losses on welfare recipients for making dis-
favored choices while leaving intact the procreative choices of
others, is troubling and raises serious questions concerning the
Supreme Court's view of the appropriate relationship of the welfare
state to poor women and other disfavored groups within the society.
Under its constitutional view, the Supreme Court subjects direct
government regulation of constitutionally protected rights to strict
judicial scrutiny but fails to scrutinize government use of benefit
allocations for regulatory purposes that significantly harm or injure
persons who make disfavored choices.92 Instead, the Supreme
Analysis of Current Equal Protection Doctrine, 13 B.C. THIRD WoRLD L.J. 1 (1992)
(arguing for a race-based equal protection "anti-subjugation" analysis of abortion
finding restrictions).
More broadly, however, some argue that the genesis of these "behavioral modifi-
cation" plans are racial and gender biases which give rise to expectations about the
propriety of the exercise of control over poor persons who are often presumed to be
disproportionately minority. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Social Meaning of the
Norplant Condition: Constitutional Considerations of Race, Class and Gender, 9
BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 9 (1994); Williams, supra note 11, at 737-41; White, supra
note 12; Roberts, supra note 74; Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REV.
1419 (1991); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of
the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interven-
tionist Mindset of Law, 53 Omo ST. L.J. 1205 (1992); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the
Inquiry: Race, Class and Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Wo-
men, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487 (1992).
To a large extent, the concept that poor persons' procreative rights are "grist" for
regulation by persons who are not poor seems hauntingly similar to ideas prevalent
during slavery when the procreative rights of slaves were legally subject entirely to
the will of slaveowners who used slave women as breeders for economic benefit. See,
e.g., Karen A. Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding South: The Implementa-
tion and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 115 (1984);
Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAw
& INEQ. J. 187 (1987). Thus, these proposals can be viewed as representing a view
that the economic power of the state over those dependent upon public assistance
includes the concomitant right to control procreative rights. Perhaps not so coinci-
dentally, many of the Court's decisions upholding benefit conditions that affected
procreative rights involved the procreative rights of welfare recipients. See, e.g.,
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1976).
92. The exceptions to this rule are benefit allocations that employ suspect classi-
fications or can be classified as penalties. The Court's recent decision in Rosenberger
might be seen in this light. See supra note 89. In that case, the Court held that the
University of Virginia could not constitutionally exclude a student organization's
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Court, based upon its doctrine of negative rights,93 sanctions virtu-
ally any minimally rational governmental distribution of benefits
as legitimate. It does so under the supposition that since the gov-
ernment was not constitutionally required to provide the benefit,
the Constitution does not limit the government's power to dis-
tribute or allocate the benefit.
Thus, in the context of welfare benefits, because any provision
of welfare benefits by the government is more than the government
is obligated to grant, the government essentially has carte blanche
to decide how to allocate such benefits.9 4 Whether the motivation
for the particular benefit allocation is eleemosynary, despotic, be-
neficent, compassionate, punitive, or oppressive is immaterial.
Rather, under the Court's analysis the Constitution gives the legis-
lature plenary authority to allocate welfare benefits to the poor.
The Court creates no floor beneath the legislature's decision, not
even when the government intentionally uses the benefits to influ-
ence the recipients' exercise of constitutional rights.9 5
This view fails to recognize the harm inflicted by government
decisions to exclude constitutional rights from funding. Family cap
plans eliminate assistance for the increased need that results from
the birth of an additional child and consign poor families to an even
more desperate existence than they otherwise would have.96 This
constitutional structure, with its privileging of regulatory govern-
ment benefit allocations, unleashes the power of the legislature to
oppressively control the constitutional rights of the poor who de-
pend upon government largesse for survival. In contrast, the con-
stitutional rights of those fortunate enough not to depend upon
government benefits for their subsistence are protected because, to
Christian newspaper from funding that the university extended to other student or-
ganization publications. 115 S. Ct. at 2524-25. There, the religious-based funding
restriction might be viewed as warranting higher scrutiny on equal protection
grounds.
93. See discussion supra part II.B.1.
94. This is generally true, except in the case of benefit allocations that employ
suspect classifications or can be classified as penalties. See discussion supra note 92.
95. Cass Sunstein argues that there is no distinction between regulation and
benefits for legislative purposes because all regulation has a redistributional eco-
nomic effect by imposing costs on the regulated party. See generally Sunstein, supra
note 22. By corollary, one could also argue that all benefit decisions have a regula-
tory effect in that they encourage or discourage individuals to modify their behavior
to obtain a benefit. However, even if all regulation is redistributional and all benefit
allocations are in effect regulatory, legislative decisions differ as to their regulatory
or benefits allocating purposes. Thus, the legislature's primary intent with respect
to certain benefits decisions may be regulatory and with respect to other regulatory
decisions may be primarily allocative, even though the effect of the decision in both
cases may be characterized as either regulatory or benefits-allocative.
96. See discussion infra part V.B.
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inflict harm upon them, the government cannot merely refuse to
give to them but instead must take away something that they have.
This confiscation constitutes an unconstitutional burden or penalty
on the constitutional rights. Consequently, the rights of the "haves"
are protected because the government lacks constitutional weapons
to affect their rights. In contrast, the rights of the "have-nots" are
jeopardized because the government constitutionally retains weap-
ons to affect their rights, namely, the deprivation of subsistence
government aid.
Government use of benefits to attack constitutional rights is
also more likely to pass legislatively when it affects only a small
and unpopular segment of the population, such as the poor or other
disfavored classes.97 For example, child limitation proposals would
probably never pass if applied to the general public. Imagine the
uproar if the government were to condition dependent-child tax ex-
emptions on passing a means test to prove that taxpayers were able
to adequately support their children, or a parenting test to prove
that they were capable parents, were lawfully wed, or could provide
a stable two-parent home. The public furor would almost certainly
defeat any such proposal. In contrast, child limitation proposals
are actually popular when applied to the poor who have considera-
bly less legislative clout.9 8 Additionally, Lucy Williams suggests
the motivation behind these child limitation proposals is grounded
in race, sex, and class bias, which lead the majority society to view
the poor as "others" who are less entitled to the equal benefit of
societal rights.99
97. Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of AFDC, The Family Support Act in
Context, 26 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457 (1987).
98. See generally Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law,
141 U. PA. L. Rav. 1277 (1993) (arguing that the poor are generally disadvantaged in
the legislative process).
99. See Williams, supra note 11 (arguing that welfare benefits plans are legisla-
tively possible only because they prey upon racist, classist, and sexist ideologies of
the society which classify poor persons of color as the "other" and thus facilitate ad-
verse political action concerning them).
These family cap proposals may also be popular because they are easy tax sav-
ing devices since states can cut back on humanitarian aid to the poor and blame the
poor's irresponsible behavior (having children while receiving welfare assistance) for
these decisions. Thus legislatures can reduce welfare and claim sympathy for the
deserving poor. An additional aspect of these particular AFDC plans is that they
often do not require federal legislation to implement them but rather mere regula-
tory or state legislative approval. For example, federal approval is obtained through
a Social Security Act § 1115 waiver process which permits Department of Health
and Human Services (HIHS) to approve a variance for federal AFDC requirements
for state demonstration projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994); Beno v. Shalala, 30
F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing HHS grant of § 1115 waiver of certain AFDC
benefit conditions in California "workfare" welfare reform program). Additionally,
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A proper view of the Constitution should see this type of gov-
ernment action as at least problematic and thus subject to height-
ened constitutional scrutiny. In particular, decisions of legislative
majorities to use benefit-allocating authority to prey upon the
poor-to use poverty itself as leverage to affect constitutionally pro-
tected behavior and value choices-should not be an automatically
legitimate use of government power.
Heightened scrutiny would not mean that the government
could not seek to influence individuals, including poor people, to
make beneficial reproductive choices that would help them to be-
come more economically self-sufficient or that would generally ben-
efit the community. 0 0  Rather, heightened scrutiny would
recognize that the means the government uses to accomplish these
goals may be problematic, even if the goal itself is not. While some
means of encouraging socially productive behavior may be appro-
priate, e.g., public information campaigns or educational programs,
harmful and oppressive means are not.
Additionally, heightened scrutiny would not constitutionally
obligate the government to provide minimum levels of benefits.
Rather, once the government decides to award benefits, the Consti-
tution should place fairness limits on the government's distribution
of those benefits and restrain government from using benefits to
harm persons because of their exercise of their constitutional
rights. Government denials of funding of an individual's constitu-
tional right expressly because the individual exercised it in a gov-
ernment-disfavored way, and particularly government use of
funding decisions to influence constitutionally-protected value and
lifestyle choices, are not merely minimally-rational legislative dis-
tributions of public resources. Rather, government use of benefits
as a club to harm the individual because of her exercise of constitu-
tional rights is as much a burden or penalty on the exercise of the
constitutional right as a direct prohibition or fine would be. In both
cases, government harms the individual because of her exercise of a
constitutional right. Although the government goal of reducing the
number of children born into poverty may be laudable,1O1 the
even though state legislative approval is required by statute, some states, such as
Arkansas, have acquired waivers with only state executive approval.
100. See, e.g., Felicia R. Lee, On a Harlem Block, Hope Is Swallowed by Decay,
N.Y. TIEs, Sept. 8, 1994, at Al (observing that poor childbearing choices may cause
impoverished people to remain mired in poverty, even though they think that such
childbearing choices are a way out).
101. The government's goal could also be viewed as genocidal, depending upon
one's view. For example, some argue that these plans are attempts by legislatures to
reduce the population of minority poor who disproportionately have more children
and disproportionately receive welfare. See Vobejda, supra note 11. When combined
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means used to achieve that goal must not impair the right of benefit
recipients to autonomous constitutionally-protected value choices.
Otherwise, the government violates basic, underlying constitu-
tional limits on government power, which are the essence of consti-
tutional protection for fundamental rights. 102
MU. Scholarly Critiques of the Supreme Court's
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
During the last two decades, scholars have substantially criti-
cized the Supreme Court's approach to analyzing the constitution-
ality of government funding conditions that adversely affect
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court's analysis occurs mostly
under the rubric of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine or the
selective funding problem.103 The unconstitutional conditions
question is whether the government may require an individual to
relinquish a constitutional right as a "condition" for receipt of gov-
ernment benefits. The selective funding question is whether the
government may fund state-favored exercises of a right but deny
funding to state-disfavored exercises of the right.104
with the disproportionate number of minority males who are incarcerated and the
denial of procreative rights to incarcerated persons, see, e.g., Goodwin v. Turner, 908
F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that prisons constitutionally could refuse an in-
mate permission to artificially inseminate his wife), these plans, if successful, may
significantly reduce the population of the poor who are disproportionately minority.
See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1926) (permitting forced sterilization of mental
patients; the sterilization laws of many states were part of the broader eugenics
movement of the early 20th century).
102. See infra part V.A.
103. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 22; Rosenthal, supra note 22.
104. Family cap plans are arguably different in form than both the classic uncon-
stitutional conditions case in which the government denies an individual who exer-
cises a right an "otherwise available" government benefit and, alternatively, the
related "selective funding" problem in which the government funds persons or activi-
ties differently on the basis of the exercise of a constitutional right. A classic exam-
ple of the former is a plan that conditions a foreign corporation license on the
company's agreement not to seek federal court jurisdiction. See generally Sullivan,
supra note 22. Here, the government grants the benefit, e.g., the license, only upon
the condition that the company give up its constitutional right to access federal
courts. An example of "selective funding" would be a government decision to deny
NEA grants to those whose art depicts prurient, but not obscene, material. Unlike
unconstitutional conditions, which broadly covers any government benefit, the selec-
tive funding problem specifically addresses the government decision to fund one ex-
ercise of the right without funding alternative exercises of the right. See generally
Rosenthal, supra note 22. With the family cap plans the government technically
neither "conditions" welfare on a recipient's decision to have an additional child, nor
does it "selectively fund" her decision to have a child over a decision not to have a
child. Instead, the government merely refuses to extend additional benefits if the
child is born. Thus, a welfare recipient who has a child "over the limit," say two
children, does not lose welfare on the birth of the additional child. She simply does
not get additional welfare. As the welfare recipient would also not get any additional
1995]
Law and Inequality
Scholars almost unanimously reject the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to unconstitutional conditions and, in particular, the Court's
burden/subsidy distinction.105 However, these scholars diverge
widely on alternative approaches for determining when, if ever, the
government may use its benefits allocating authority to affect an
individual's exercise of otherwise constitutionally-protected rights.
Some argue that rights-affecting benefit conditions are invalid if
they improperly "coerce" or "threaten" the recipient's exercise of a
constitutional right. Thus, the key is to determine which benefit
conditions "coerce" or "threaten" the exercise of a constitutional
right and which do not.10 6 Other authors retain the emphasis on
penalties but seek to identify a better baseline than the Court's en-
titlement baseline from which to ascertain whether the government
had "penalized" the exercise of a constitutional right.107 Still
welfare if she decided not to have a child, one could argue that the funding decision
is independent of the welfare mother's procreative choices. This is one of the argu-
ments, for example, of the federal district court in CX v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991
(D.N.J. 1995). See supra note 22.
However, family cap plans condition eligibility for welfare on the timing of a
recipient's decision to have children. If she has an additional child while receiving
welfare, she gets only $X in benefits. If she has an additional child while not receiv-
ing welfare and later qualifies for welfare, she will get $X in benefits plus an addi-
tional $Y for the additional child. Thus, a welfare recipient is eligible for additional
benefits only if she forgoes her constitutional right to decide when she will bear chil-
dren. It is this limit on the timing of her choice that implicates her constitutional
right to procreative choice.
105. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 22. See also discussion supra part III.
106. See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 1293 (1984). Kreimer argues that an
unconstitutional condition on a government benefit is one that can be characterized
as a "threat" or a "coercive" condition rather than a non-coercive offer. Kreimer de-
fines a coercive government benefit condition as one that makes the individual worse
off than he would have been in the normal course of events. See also Rosenthal,
supra note 22. Rosenthal argues that government benefit conditions should be in-
validated if they threaten or are as "destructive" of individual rights as direct regula-
tion. In contrast, benefit conditions are permissible if they "expand" liberty by
increasing the options available to individuals. Cf Sullivan, supra note 22 (arguing
against these coercion arguments); Charles R. Bogle, Note, "Unconscionable" Condi-
tions." A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 193 (1994). Bogle argues that government conditions on welfare benefits are
improperly coercive if the benefit condition is likely in fact to cause the person to
forfeit the constitutional right in order to obtain the benefit. Such conditions, he
argues, are "unconscionable" because they require the recipient to pay too high of a
"price" for the benefit. Id. at 232-36.
107. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 106. Kreimer advocates three possible "base-
lines" from which to determine what a coercive condition would be: (a) history (in
which a "coercive" condition would be one where the government previously has pro-
vided the benefit, only to threaten to withdraw it if the individual exercises her con-
stitutional right); (b) equality (in which a "coercive" condition is one that threatens to
make the individual worse off than other similarly situated people who are receiving
benefits); and (c) a predictive baseline (in which coercive offers are those that make
the individual worse off than she would have been if the government had not im-
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others argue that benefit conditions are problematic if they disad-
vantage recipients as compared to other similarly-situated
persons.108
Recent scholarship mounts a frontal attack on the underlying
foundation of the Supreme Court's approach. Kathleen Sullivan,
Richard Epstein, and Cass Sunstein have written the most compre-
hensive and thoughtful recent analyses of unconstitutional condi-
tions.109 Both Kathleen Sullivan and Richard Epstein seek to
posed the benefit condition). My article might be viewed as an argument against the
relevance of artificial baselines to determine whether an individual has been "penal-
ized" by government funding conditions. Instead, my article argues that the focus
should shift from whether an individual has suffered a legally cognizable penalty to
whether the individual has in fact been harmed by a denial of funding. When viewed
this way it should be clear that any government denial of funding constitutes harm
in fact, in that the individual does not have the funding. It is irrelevant whether the
individual is "entitled" to the funding. The fact that the individual is denied the
funding is harm in fact. The question then becomes, has the government harmed the
individual by denying her funding because of the exercise of a constitutional right, or
was the denial for some other rights-neutral reason, i.e., the individual did not other-
vise fit the egibiity requrements for the program? If the former, then the gavern-
ment action should be subject to heightened scrutiny. See generally discussion infra
part IV.C.
108. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 75 ComiELL L. REV. 1185 (1990). Baker, who focuses on pub-
lic assistance benefits, argues that Supreme Court welfare benefit cases can be
explained as holding that a welfare benefit is an unconstitutional penalty if it re-
quires the welfare recipient to pay a higher price to exercise her constitutional rights
than other similarly situated persons earning a subsistence income. Id. at 1220.
Professor Baker identifies this higher price as the loss of an entitlement for the exer-
cise of the right. Id. at 1230. Professor Baker discusses the Medicaid abortion fund-
ing cases and argues that Medicaid recipients denied abortion coverage were no
worse off than non-Medicaid recipients, each of whom is required to pay the market
price for her abortion. That the government refused to subsidize the abortions sim-
ply left the women in the position they would have been in had they not been Medi-
caid recipients. This argument, however, disregards the fact that these Medicaid
recipients were in the Medicaid program and were eligible for Medicaid funding. Ac-
cordingly, they were denied funding for medically necessary treatment because that
treatment was an abortion. Thus, although they were not "penalized" in the sense
that they were deprived of a legal entitlement and thus forced to pay a higher price
to exercise the right than a non-recipient, they were harmed in fact in the sense that
they were denied government funding that otherwise would have been available to
them but for their exercise of a constitutional right. See also Gary Feinerman, Un-
constitutional Conditions: The Crossroads of Substantive Rights and Equal Protec-
tion, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1406-07 (1991) (arguing for an "equality' based analysis
of unconstitutional conditions ii which the court applies "intermediate scrutiny" to
benefit conditions that affect the "comparative ability of individuals to exercise their
constitutional rights by granting the conditions of liberty to some but not others").
Feinerman argues that the intermediate scrutiny analysis should consider four fac-
tors: (1) equality among individuals, (2) equality among groups, (3) the relative im-
portance to individuals of the benefit at issue, and (4) whether the state is the
predominant supplier of the betefit. Id. at 14 AA . See aLso Kreimer, supra note
106 (partially advocating an equality approach).
109. See generally Sullivan, supra note 22; RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, BARGAING WITH
THE STATE (1993); SUNsTIN, supra note 18.
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expand the scope of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; both
shift focus away from the individual rightsholders and instead
ground the analysis of unconstitutional conditions in the systemic
problems they claim such conditions cause.110 In contrast, Cass
Sunstein supports abandoning the doctrine altogether and substi-
tuting a more straightforward rights analysis that would ask
merely whether the challenged condition's intrusion on the particu-
lar right is justified by a legitimate governmental interest.
Sullivan argues that theories of coercion, including those in
the Supreme Court's analysis, are flawed by their lack of any princi-
pled basis to distinguish coercive conditions from ones that are sim-
ply voluntary bargains by the benefit recipient. 1 ' Instead,
Sullivan argues, unconstitutional conditions analysis should look
beyond the relationship between the individual and government to
consider the adverse effect of such conditions on the distribution of
rights among rightsholders and on the distinction between the pub-
lic and private realms of society. Under her view, government ben-
efits allocations would be unconstitutional if their purpose or
primary effect is to pressure the exercise of a constitutional right.
Such conditions, she urges, ought to be subject to the same strict
level of constitutional scrutiny as government decisions that di-
rectly regulate the constitutional right.112 One difficulty with Sulli-
van's view is identifying when a constitutional right is pressured.
Indeed, any government condition can be seen as pressuring a con-
stitutional right if the government fails to fund one right but funds
an alternative activity. Accordingly, once one goes beyond inten-
tional government attempts to influence the exercise of the consti-
tutional right it is unclear how to distinguish between rights-
pressuring and non-rights-pressuring government conditions.
Cass Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court's formulation of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in its insistence upon pro-
tecting only common law property rights, reflects an arbitrary
privileging of the status quo distribution of entitlement. Such
privileging, he argues, mistakenly assumes that government action
that affects constitutional rights is not rights-violative if it does not
disturb existing entitlements. Instead, he concludes, such govern-
110. See also David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres
of Neutrality in Government Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1992) (arguing
that constitutional restrictions on government funded speech should be analyzed as
establishing institutional "spheres of neutrality" in which social values of fostering
public deliberation require government neutrality with respect to funding
conditions).
111. See Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1428-56.
112. Id. at 1499-1505.
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ment benefit conditions are rights-pressuring and should be invalid
unless the pressure on the individual right has a "legitimate legis-
lative justification."113 Sunstein also argues that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine impossibly attempts a general solution to
the problem of rights-pressuring benefit conditions, whereas differ-
ent constitutional rights warrant different analysis. Thus, some
rights may be rights to government neutrality that prevent the gov-
ernment from discriminating among particular exercises of the
right. In contrast, other rights may not be rights to government
neutrality, in which case the government would have more freedom
to affect the rights through benefit conditions.114
Accordingly, Sunstein argues, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should be abandoned. Instead, each benefit condition
should be analyzed separately to determine whether the legislative
justification for the benefit condition justifies the intrusion upon the
particular right.115 By permitting a legislative justification that is
merely legitimate rather than compelling, Sunstein advocates a
lower level of scrutiny for benefit conditions than for burdens or
penalties on fundamental rights. Sunstein's approach is problem-
atic because the harm to an individual caused by loss of government
benefits can be at least as devastating as small penalties or fines.
Therefore, the same level of legislative justification should be re-
quired in both cases to sustain the government action.
In contrast, Richard Epstein argues that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is not about protecting constitutional rights at
all, but rather is about protecting individuals from unfair takings of
property. Under his view, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
should invalidate government conditions on benefits that worsen
the redistributive effect of government takings by taxation.116 He
cares little whether the benefit tondition pressures oT affects an in-
dependent constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or the
right to procreate. Instead, he cares only whether the government
funding condition affects property rights by increasing the redis-
tributive burden that comes from taxation. He thus argues that a
condition on government grants should be unconstitutional if it is
inefficient because it does not increase the social surplus, which
113. See generally SUNsTEin, supra note 18. Sunstein's position is not limited to
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. He argues that this "status quo neutrality"
concept spans much of the Supreme Court's analysis in a variety of doctrinal areas,
including due process, standing, race and sex discrimination, and takings law. Id. at
68-92.
114. Id. at 315-18. See also Sunstein, supra note 22.
115. Sunstein, supra note 22. Cf Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding
Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REv. 989 (1991).
116. See generally EpsTmN, supra note 109.
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seems to mean the aggregate value of property of individual mem-
bers of the society, or it is inequitable because it does increase the
social surplus but distributes the surplus unequally among mem-
bers of the society.1 17 Epstein's view would invalidate even a small
need-based redistribution of property from the top one percent of
the society to the bottom one percent, since such a distribution
would simply redistribute wealth without increasing total wealth.
Moreover, even if such a redistribution of wealth did increase total
property values, perhaps by reducing urban ills, such a social sur-
plus from beneficial government action would also be unconstitu-
tional unless it was equally distributed to all members of society,
rich and poor. If, for example, the poor benefitted more than the
rich, then the government would have to pay compensation to the
rich to remedy the unfair government taking.118
Epstein's view would not have to be tied to constitutional
rights at all, since it implies that any inefficient redistribution of
public resources should be unconstitutional, regardless of whether
the redistribution otherwise impacts constitutional rights. Accord-
ingly, Professor Epstein has some difficulty using this analysis to
determine which government benefit conditions violate individual
rights. As he recognizes, such benefit programs begin with the
proposition that redistribution of societal benefits is permissible.119
Ultimately, he adopts a balancing test for determining the constitu-
tionality of benefit conditions and asks whether there is a minimal
government justification for the rights-affecting conditions.120
Since this minimal rationality test constitutes considerably lower
scrutiny than that Epstein would apply to government takings of
wealth by redistributive social policies,121 his view seemingly
reverses current constitutional doctrine by applying strict scrutiny
to deprivations of economic rights and rational relations scrutiny to
deprivations of non-economic constitutional rights.
Epstein thus ignores government funding conditions that af-
fect the constitutional rights of non-property holders, such as poor
people dependent upon the government for subsistence support.
Because poor people have no property to take, they have no cogniza-
ble interests in Professor Epstein's view, and thus they have no
right to complain about any adverse action the government takes
against them. As the poor are likely to be less politically powerful
117. Id. at 95-98.
118. Id. at 90-103.
119. See, e.g., id. at 278-79.
120. See, e.g., id. at 278-94.
121. Id. at 90-97.
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than more propertied interests,' 22 Epstein's argument construes
the Constitution to protect the most fortunate members of the soci-
ety from government actions while turning the poor into a perpet-
ual class of victims of whatever oppression the vagaries of the
legislative process heap upon them.
Epstein apparently favors an anti-takings analysis because of
an almost blind faith in market forces as the sole just or correct
method of social organization. Any government action that upsets
the result of the private market is constitutionally suspect. 123 Such
a view, whatever its general merits, patently ignores historical
race, sex, and class biases that have substantially contributed to
the current distribution of assets within the society. 124
Of the three analyses, Sunstein's approach appears to be the
most successful at actually formulating a workable alternative ap-
proach to the Supreme Court's much-maligned burden/subsidy dis-
tinction because it transfers general constitutional rights analysis
to the benefit conditions problem. His basic analysis asks: does the
government action affect the right, and if so, is it nevertheless justi-
fied by a countervailing governmental interest? However, by focus-
ing only on the impact of funding conditions on rights, none of the
analysts adequately consider that government funding conditions
affect not merely rights but also individuals who wish to exercise
those rights. Instead, almost all of these analyses treat the harm
caused by the loss of a government benefit as an abstract concept
such as pressure upon a constitutional right, rather than as an ac-
tual loss or suffering imposed upon real people. Kathleen Sullivan
coined the term pressure in her analysis; Sunstein also speaks fre-
quently and abstractly of funding conditions as "rights-pressuring."
This abstraction misses the point of protecting the constitutional
rights of individuals. Constitutional rights protect not only an ab-
stract concept of rights from infringement, they also protect people
from being harmed by government for wanting to engage in consti-
tutionally-protected activities that government, for whatever rea-
122. See discussion supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
123. Sunstein disputes the idea that government may disclaim responsibility for
economic consequences of the market. See generally Sunstein, supra note 22. He
argues that, given the current state of government regulation of private economic
activity, government cannot claim merely to be a spectator on what is otherwise the
invisible hand of the market. However, even if government were not responsible for
a person's poverty, this still should not necessarily mean that government may con-
stitutionally use a person's poverty as leverage to affect her exercise of constitutional
rights.
124. See, e.g., WiLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADvANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY 112-13 (1987) (noting that the cumulative ef-
fects of centuries or even decades of race and class discrimination can hinder disad-
vantaged citizens from full participation in free and open markets).
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son, disfavors. It is this harm to an individual linked to the exercise
of the right, and not merely an abstract harm to the right, that
should be of constitutional significance.
IV. A Harm-Based Approach to Welfare Benefit
Conditions
Government denials of funding linked to the exercise of consti-
tutional rights can harm people as much as, if not more than, im-
prisonment, fines, or penalties for the exercise of the right. Rights-
based government funding conditions make people suffer as the
price for exercising their constitutional rights. Current theory errs
by failing to focus on this harm.
A. Shortcomings of Current Theory
Typical unconstitutional conditions analysis fails to focus on
harm to the individual, but obscures the harm by using abstrac-
tions such as "rights-pressuring" or "refusals to subsidize" rights.
This analysis misleadingly suggests that the only problem with
linking government funding to the exercise of constitutional rights
is the effect on the individual's ability to exercise the constitutional
right. The traditional analysis asks whether the funding condition
coerces the individual into giving up the righti25 or places an obsta-
cle between the individual and the exercise of the right.' 26
Instead, rights-based denials of funding harm the individual
because of her exercise of the right. This harm is itself constitution-
ally problematic. Constitutional rights do not merely ensure that
people can engage in protected activity. Constitutional rights also
ensure that government does not harm people because they engage
in protected activity, even if the government harm fails to prevent
the exercise of the right. i 27 The power to impose suffering is gov-
ernment's principal weapon for attacking rights. Rarely can gov-
ernment directly compel people to act in a particular way because
government can rarely physically control individuals. i 28 Rather,
the government ordinarily must act indirectly by attaching harm
such as jail terms, fines, or loss of funding to government-disfa-
vored activity and by attaching benefits such as government fund-
ing to government-favored activity. Thus, to effectively restrain
125. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 22.
126. See supra notes 60, 70-73 and accompanying text.
127. See Richard J. Fallon, Individual Rights and the Power of Government, 27
GA. L. Rzv. 343 (1993) (arguing that theories about the limit of government power
are an independent source for constitutional rights).
128. See discussion infra note 138.
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government from attacking constitutionally protected rights, it is
necessary to restrain the government's power to harm an individual
because of her exercise of the right.
Accordingly, if instead of focusing solely on the effects of fund-
ing conditions on the ability to exercise the right one focuses on gov-
ernmental tools for imposing harm or suffering-these instruments
of oppression, if broadly stated-one can discern significant
problems with the Supreme Court's analysis of rights-based govern-
ment funding conditions. To illustrate, the Supreme Court obvi-
ously recognizes the need to protect against government-imposed
harm in the direct regulatory context since it invalidates burdens
on constitutional rights short of direct prohibition. 12 9 However,
when addressing government funding conditions, the Court refuses
129. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In a joint opinion,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter suggested that the burden that was prob-
lematic for the exercise of a constitutional right was government action that made it
more difficult, as a factual matter, for the individual to exercise her constitutional
right. Id. at 2821. Such a view would shift focus away from harm to the individual
to whether this harm actually prevented or obstructed the individual's exercise of
the right. However, this position would be inconsistent with traditional, fundamen-
tal-rights burdens cases, such as Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
which protect individuals against government harm inflicted upon them because of
their exercise of a constitutional right. Not surprisingly, instead of citing these
traditional fundamental rights cases to support their definition of a fundamental
right, the three Justices cited the unconstitutional conditions opinions such as Har-
ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1976). Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2819. However, these cases did not involve direct
government regulation of constitutional rights, whereas Casey did. Indeed, the
Court in the unconstitutional conditions cases denied that constitutional rights were
even implicated, on the ground that to do so would improperly create a positive con-
stitutional right to government benefits. Nevertheless, this part of the Casey opin-
ion bootstrapped these inapplicable unconstitutional conditions cases to support the
sition that naymwly Tedefined the original fuda ental right. Under this redefi-
nition, a fundamental right is violated only if government action places a substantial
obstacle between the citizen and the exercise of the right. This view distorts the
basic conception of protection of rights. It would also permit government to impose
considerable harm on a person for exercising the right, provided that the person
cares enough about the right to exercise it anyway. In any event, the result in Casey
is probably more consistent with a harm-based analysis than with the three Justices'
substantial obstacle approach. Thus, the Casey opinion upheld a 24-hour waiting
period for abortion, 112 S.Ct. at 2826, while striking down a spousal notification
provision. Id. at 2831. However, the three Justices' substantial obstacle or "deter-
rence" approach, if upholding the 24-hour waiting period, would seem to also support
the constitutionality of the spousal notification provision. If the focus is to be
whether the woman is actually, in fact, deterred from having an abortion, the
spousal notification provision does not seem any more likely to block the actual abor-
tion than the 24-hour waiting period would. In either case, the woman is free, after-
wards, to come back and have an abortion, with or without the hosband's consent.
In contrast, the spousal notification provision seems more likely than the 24-hour
waiting period to emotionally, or sometimes physically (in the case of abusive hus-
bands), harm the woman who seeks to have the abortion. This harm-based analysis
would seem more consistent with, and provide a sounder basis for, the Casey result.
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to recognize that government funding decisions can similarly harm
individuals. Instead, the Court interprets the Constitution to per-
mit government to use funding conditions that encourage, influ-
ence, or persuade citizens to sacrifice rights, given no more than a
rational government interest, provided that the means the govern-
ment chooses are mere refusals to subsidize the protected
activity.130
Three types of doctrinal arguments are generally advanced to
justify blindness to government harm from refusals to subsidize
rights. These arguments proffer that the government's refusal to
subsidize the constitutional right neither violates the right nor un-
fairly deprives the individual of the government benefit.
The first argument is that rights-based refusals to subsidize
constitutional rights do not infringe upon the constitutional right as
a direct fine or penalty does 13 1 because a refusal to subsidize or pay
for the right merely leaves the individual free, as before, to exercise
the right at her own expense.' 3 2 Since the government's refusal to
subsidize the right does not prevent or hinder the individual from
exercising the right, there is no constitutional violation. 133 Under
this view, a constitutional right merely protects an individual's
ability or freedom to exercise the right. However, the Constitution
also protects an individual even if she is perfectly free to exercise
the constitutional right but is harmed by the government because of
her choice. That is, for government action to be constitutional, the
130. See discussion supra parts II.B.1, 2.
131. See discussion supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980). See also Susan Frelich
Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abor-
tion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare Rights The-
sis, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 721 (1981) (arguing that Supreme Court abortion funding
cases can be explained as holding that the Medicaid funding restrictions do not im-
pinge the constitutional rights at stake). This argument obviously has less weight in
the context of government subsistence welfare programs where, by definition, the
individual has no independent resources, other than government aid, to use to pay
for the right. Here, the argument that the individual is free to exercise the right
rings hollow when the individual lacks resources to pay for the right. However, this
concern applies whenever the government refuses to pay for poor people to exercise
their constitutional rights and implies that government is obligated to pay for poor
people's constitutional rights. As stated earlier, see discussion supra note 23, this
article does not address whether the government is constitutionally obligated either
to provide basic levels of subsistence or to pay generally for poor people's constitu-
tional rights. Rather, this article argues that once the government makes the deci-
sion to award funding, it should generally not be able to selectively deny such
funding on the basis of the individual's exercise of a constitutionSl right, because
such a government decision improperly harms the individual because of the exercise
of the right.
133. Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard announced in Casey is of this ilk.
112 S. Ct. at 2820-21. See discussion supra note 129.
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individual must not merely be able to exercise the right, she must
be able to exercise the right free of government-imposed harm for
having done so. 13 4 For example, in the case of the obviously uncon-
stitutional fine or penalty for the exercise of the right, the individ-
ual nevertheless generally remains free to exercise the right in the
technical sense that she remains physically able to do so. Thus, if
the government fines someone for having an abortion, she is still
free to have an abortion, that is, physically able to abort the child.
The fine does not prohibit her from aborting the child, it simply pe-
nalizes or harms her for doing so. Thus, the constitutional violation
is not the loss of her freedom to exercise the right, it is the imposi-
tion of government harm, i.e., a penalty, for the exercise of the
right.
When viewed in this light, it should be clear that government
decisions to selectively refuse to subsidize rights can be just as
rights-violative as a government fine, penalty, or other burden on
the right. In both cases the government harms or injures an indi-
vidual for the exercise of the right. In the case of a fine or penalty,
the harm is obviously the fine or the penalty.135 In the case of a
government's selective refusal to subsidize the exercise of a consti-
tutional right, the harm is the denial of government benefits that
would have been provided if the individual had exercised the right
in a government-favored manner. In both cases, the individual re-
mains free to exercise the right but may do so only by suffering a
harm or loss imposed by government.' 3 6 Either both types of gov-
ernment action should raise constitutional problems or neither
should.
The second argument advanced to justify doctrinal blindness
to harm caused by refusals to subsidize is that any harm imposed
by government's selective refusals to subsidize constitutional rights
is permissible because it is simply the result of a voluntary choice
by the individual.137 The government merely conditions funding
upon the relinquishment of a constitutional right; the government
134. See discussion infra part V.A.
135. If there is no penalty for violation, the government's prohibition has no real
teeth and is merely a precatory statement of government policy.
136. See, e.g., SUNSTEN, supra note 18, at 293 (noting that "there is no fundamen-
tal or metaphysical difference between the unconstitutional conditions case depriv-
ing individuals of benefits and the ordinary constitutional case requiring payment of
a fine"). Professor Sunstein argues that the resiliency of this distinction in the doc-
trine is rooted in the Court's inclination to arbitrarily protect status quo entitle-
ments, e.g., the current distribution of property rights. Accord EPSTEIN, supra note
109, at 11 (challenging the distinction between involuntary and voluntary bargains
with the government).
137. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-75.
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does not deprive the individual of either the right or the benefit.
The individual makes a voluntary choice between the right and the
benefit. With selective government funding, the government
merely offers assistance on condition that the recipient makes the
favored choice. The government might offer the welfare recipient
subsistence support for her children, provided that those children
are not born while she is receiving welfare. The recipient simply
chooses between her procreative rights and her future child's eligi-
bility for welfare assistance. Thus, the argument goes, the individ-
ual has lost neither her constitutional right nor the government
benefit; she has merely freely decided to waive one to get the
other. 138
However, a freedom of choice argument would apply equally to
government imposition of jail terms or fines for exercising a consti-
tutional right. For example, suppose the government imposed a jail
term or ten dollar fine for each child born while a family received
welfare. Under Supreme Court doctrine such a levy on procreative
choices would presumptively violate the welfare recipient's consti-
tutional right to procreate, 13 9 while the refusal to award benefits
138. The classical response to this view is to argue that the government's threat to
remove the benefit coerces the welfare recipient into relinquishing her right, or into
exercising it in a manner favored by government. See generally Sullivan, supra note
22, at 1428-56. Sullivan argues that coercion arguments are flawed because they
depend upon, but fail to articulate, an underlying normative theory to explain why
some voluntary transactions are freely entered into while others are coercive. Coer-
cion arguments are also unsound because they look to the individual's ability to exer-
cise the constitutional right to justify overriding the individual's voluntary choice
between the right and the benefit. In fact, except in unusual cases, individuals are
always physically free or able to exercise their constitutional rights, even with direct
government regulation of the right. The government rarely has the power to directly
compel someone to act or not to act in a particular way, unless the individual is in a
straitjacket or under mind control. Ordinarily, even the government's use of physi-
cal force to compel action operates upon the individual only indirectly by threatening
the individual with negative consequences (death or physical injury) if he does not
comply with the request. The individual is thus almost always free to make a deci-
sion contrary to the decision the government wishes him or her to make. The gov-
ernment's sole power, except in rare circumstances, is to attach negative
consequences to the disfavored choice to discourage the choice. Thus, whether the
negative consequence is a fine or penalty or other burden, such as the loss of other-
wise available benefits, the governmental technique is the same and thus should be
treated the same for constitutional purposes.
139. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 617 (1965) (invalidating state
criminal law imposing fines or jail terms for contraceptive use); Carey v. Population
Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that a state law that required contraceptives
to be sold only by licensed pharmacists violated right to privacy of contraceptive
users by making it more difficult and expensive to obtain contraceptives); cf Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2818-21 (arguing that statutes that made it more difficult to obtain an
abortion were constitutional provided that they did not impose an "undue burden" on
the constitutional right of pregnant women to receive an abortion).
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would be a permissible refusal to subsidize procreative rights.14o
However, whether faced with a fine or the loss of welfare eligibility,
in both cases the mother voluntarily chooses between her procrea-
tive rights and the negative government consequence. The volunta-
riness of the individual's response to the two types of government
action cannot distinguish their constitutionality. Either both are
permissible voluntary waivers of rights, or neither is.
A third argument against acknowledging government-im-
posed harm because of a refusal to subsidize suggests that an indi-
vidual's loss of funding is of no constitutional significance because
the individual had no right or entitlement to the funding. This
analysis mirrors the argument that the recipient voluntarily waives
the constitutional right to receive the funding. Although the gov-
ernent cannot require a welfare recipient to give up a legally-pro-
tected entitlement to keep her constitutional right, welfare is not
such an entitlement until legally defined by government. 141 Ac-
cordingly, the government can choose to grant benefits on any
terms whatsoever, including terms requiring the waiver of constitu-
tional rights. 142 Since the welfare recipient never owned a right to
the funding, she has lost nothing when it is taken away.
Sunstein strongly criticizes the entitlement argument and ar-
gues that by protecting only preexisting rights or entitlements from
government attack, the Supreme Court improperly privileges the
status quo distribution of property without reasoned explanation or
justification. 143 What is also troubling about the law only recogniz-
ing losses of things that individuals are entitled to is that the law
thus ignores the suffering that can result from denials of funding,
particularly denials of subsistence welfare assistance. Whether or
not an individual is legally entitled to government benefits, the loss
of such benefits is a significant harm or injury to that individual
which can be greater than the harm from a small penalty or fine.
140. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (holding that government
exclusion of Medicaid payments for medically necessary abortions was a mere re-
fusal to subsidize the patient's right to an abortion and did not violate the constitu-
tional rights of Medicaid recipients); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding
that government could constitutionally prohibit doctors at publicly-funded family
planning clinics from counseling poor women about abortion since such a condition
was a mere government refusal to pay for the exercise of constitutional rights of
physicians and their patients).
141. This is true at least as against legislative redefinition.
142. For examples of this argument, see generally Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-317;
Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
143. See generally SuNsTEiN, supra note 18. Professor Sunstein argues that this
knee-jerk privileging of status quo entitlement is endemic to much of the Supreme




With subsistence welfare benefits, a destitute family's basic sur-
vival may depend upon the level of welfare benefits provided.144
When the rent bill comes due and the children born while the fam-
ily was receiving welfare need shoes to attend school and winter
coats to fend off the cold, the loss of government funding is no less
harmful because the welfare recipient had no antecedent "right" to
the funding. Her suffering and her family's suffering are starkly
real. This suffering results directly from the government decision
not to award her benefits. 145
When the government imposes suffering on an individual
solely because she chooses to exercise her constitutionally-protected
rights, such government action should equally violate the constitu-
tional right, whether the cause of the suffering is a government de-
nial of funding or the imposition of a fine, burden, or penalty.146
144. This point, of course, is one of the key insights of the Goldberg v. Kelly deci-
sion, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and also of the classic Charles Reich article, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), namely, that an individual can be as injured by
the loss of a benefit to which she has no antecedent right as by the loss of a common
law property interest.
145. The Supreme Court's classic response here is to argue that the recipient's
suffering in this case is the result of her poverty, not of government action. Cass
Sunstein makes the point that the recipient's poverty should also be viewed as the
result of government action, that is, as the product of government regulatory deci-
sions to protect the property of others and thus exclude her from access to the shoes,
clothing, and other necessities of life for her children. SUNsTEIN, supra note 18, at
69-71. However, even if her poverty were, inaccurately, to be viewed as simply the
result of the normal private ordering of market forces, the governnient's decision to
extlude her child from subsistence welfare benefts because the thild .was ro, wbile
the family was receiving welfare is most decidedly government action, even if her
poverty is not. The consequence of the government decision to exclde her from ben-
efits is that she is left to suffer from the destitution that the welfare program was
designed to redress. However, this does not mean that the government can lift up its
hands and disclaim responsibility for her state, especially when, as with these family
cap plans, the government intentionally exploits her poverty as leverage to influence
her exercise of constitutional rights. See discussion infra part IV.B.
146. Much recent scholarship seeks to invalidate conditions on government bene-
fits not because of the impact of such conditions on the individual benefit recipient or
rightsholder, but because of the harmful social consequences of the deprivation of
rights. Thus, these scholars argue, certain benefit conditions should be unconstitu-
tional because they cause systemic societal harms, which justifies preventing the
government and the individual rightsholder from bargaining away these constitu-
tional rights to the detriment of the society at large. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note
22; EPsTEiN, supra note 109. Both of these writers ground their unconstitutional
conditions analysis at least in part upon societal harm rather than individual harm.
This article argues that, regardless of the societal impact of goverrnent decisions to
harm an individual because of the exercise of a constitutional right, rights-based
harm to the individual itself should be sufficient to violate the right.
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B. The Special Problem of Government-Imposed, Rights-
Hostile Allocative Harm to the Poor
The essence of constitutional fundamental rights protection
should be protection against government using the threat of harm
as leverage over individuals' constitutional rights. This power to
harm is government's primary mechanism to adversely affect con-
stitutional rights, particularly rights to voluntary choice. If the
constitutional right does not protect against such government
harm, it does not protect the constitutional right at all. This should
be the real lesson of the cases protecting procreative rights. That
is, the only way to protect the right is to denude the government of
weapons that it can use to successfully attack the right, namely, the
power to impose suffering or harm. Restrictions on government
power should apply regardless of whether the harm is a loss of gov-
ernment funding, a fine, penalty, or imprisonment.
The need to restrict the misuse of government allocative
power is particularly troublesome where government uses subsis-
tence welfare benefits as a carrot to influence poor individuals' be-
havior. Welfare benefits provide children's basic survival needs
such as food, shelter, and clothing.147 Limitations on benefits at-
tack parents' constitutionally protected right to make certain pri-
vate, procreative, moral and value choices free from government
interference. The government exploits a family's poverty and dis-
tress as leverage to persuade the mother to sacrifice her procreative
rights and to improperly substitute government preferred procrea-
tive choices. The government thus declares to welfare families that,
because they depend on state funding for their children's needs, the
government's procreative choices must prevail over their own. Un-
derlying this action is apparently a societal view that poverty is
caused by, at best, inferior decision making and, at worst, immoral-
ity and sloth,148 rather than by unfortunate circumstances such as
being born poor in a society where child poverty means the depriva-
tion of virtually everything required to participate meaningfully
within the economic system.14 9 The poor are deprived of equal edu-
147. These family cap plans generally apply only to cash assistance and usually
exempt in-kind welfare assistaice, such as food stamps and housing subsidies. How-
ever, except for medical benefits, in-kind aid often covers only a portion of the actual
market cost; the recipient must pay the rest from cash assistance.
148. If this were true, the idle rich would be destitute.
149. See generally White, supra note 12 (arguing that much of the recent anti-
welfare groundswell misinterprets the lives of the poor and is rooted in myths about
the character of the poor and the causes of poverty rather than upon a true under-
standing of the systemic hurdles that trap poor women in poverty and psychically or
physically penalize them when they try to escape).
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cation,150 residence in an environment safe enough for economic ac-
tivity to flourish, and access to persons of power, influence, and
knowledge who might mentor them through the shoals of a com-
plex, technocratic society.1 51 Nevertheless, the wealthy and the
middle-class assume that their good fortune is the result of innate
mental and moral superiority, rather than fortunate circumstances
which better position them to flourish within the society. 152
In any event, a rights-based government exclusion from wel-
fare benefits, and the consequent harm the individual suffers,
should certainly implicate the individual's constitutional right to
procreative choice as much as a ten dollar fine would. This is true
regardless of whether the government, the taxpaying citizens, or
the community are acting upon a good faith belief that such procre-
ative value choices are immoral, unjust, or simply unadvisable.
Once one decides that the Constitution commits value choices to the
individual to privately wrestle with in her soul, conscience, and
judgment, rather than to the public choice of the political majority,
the wisdom or appropriateness of the individual's value choice is
irrelevant.153 If a fine or a burden on the right would violate the
150. See generally JONATHAN KozOL, SAVAGE INEQUALrTIES: CHILDREN IN
AMERmCA'S SCHOOLS (1991).
151. Of course, one argument is that the societal response is to forbid poor people
from having children, thus decreasing the number of children born into poverty.
This argument, of course, ignores the constitutional rights of the poor and could be
used to sanction anything from forced sterilization of poor women to genocide of poor
children. What might be more appropriate is to actually remove some of the barriers
between poor people and real economic opportunity.
152. Indeed, much of what passes for the poverty of values among the poor is re-
ally a rational, although ultimately cancerous and socially destructive, response to
the fact of poverty. See, e.g., White, supra note 12. Thus, for example, criminal
activity, as it is for wealthy white collar criminals such as Michael Milken, is a quick
and dirty path to relative wealth in a society that highly values economic wealth.
Similarly, gang membership supplies goods to poor youths, including a sense of com-
munity in a society in which they are despised, security in the war zone of most poor
neighborhoods, and status often not otherwise available to the poor. On top of it all
is superimposed the vision of middle class moralists who are convinced that they
know better, even though they have never lived in the environment in which the
poor live, and who seek to impose their will upon the poor with the tools of power
which, in the family cap context, is political control over AFDC benefit decisions.
153. Indeed, what fundamental rights protect is the individual's right to make
certain private value choices which may be inconsistent with those of the commu-
nity. In a prior article, I argued that government value choices should be made by
consensual, participatory processes. See Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and
Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 273 (1993). However, while I be-
lieve that this is true for value choices that are legitimately to be decided by the
public, the society, or the community, such a conclusion would not apply to value
choices which constitutionally are, and should be, committed to the discretion of the
individual. Fundamental rights doctrine can be seen as demarcating those areas of
private choice, and the decision to bear or beget children is and should be one of
those rights.
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right because of its adverse effect on the rights-holder, a rights-
based government decision to deny subsistence welfare benefits
should be acknowledged as at least as harmful as a fine, and at
least as constitutionally suspect. 154
The Court's traditional response to those who invoke the suf-
fering of the poor to challenge rights-based government denial of
aid is to assert that such suffering, while perhaps sad, is not the
government's fault but is instead the irremediable consequence of
154. Of course, one implication of this argument might be that the government
has a constitutional obligation to redress at least some sufficiently high level of
human suffering. That is, if a government refusal to redress suffering is the imposi-
tion of harm, when the government refusal is tied to the exercise of a constitutional
right, perhaps a government refusal to redress abject suffering is a harm of constitu-
tional significance regardless of whether the government refusal is linked to a preex-
isting constitutional right. One way to think of this is as a fundamental
constitutional right to be free from devastating suffering. This could include, for
example, abject poverty, racism, sexism, or other types of collective social malaise, or
the combination thereof, which operate to deprive individuals of the opportunity to
effectively function as full members of the society and thus deprive them of the op-
portunity to punue a mearing(NA svi.a existente. See, e.g., Robeifts, suprn note 74
(arguing that the Rust v. Sullivan decision, by upholding the abortion gag rule that
deprived poor women clients of Title X family planning clinics of complete and accu-
rate information about methods of family planning by denying them information
about abortion, deprived them of what perhaps should be a constitutional right to
the knowledge necessary to achieve their own liberation from oppression); Tribe,
supra note 23 (arguing generally that the Constitution should be interpreted to pro-
vide positive constitutional rights to funding for some essential subsistence needs).
However, the definition of such a constitutional right obviously raises particu-
larly thorny questions concerning the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation,
and the legitimate role of the state. Moreover, apart from legitimacy questions, one
could also ask appropriateness questions. First, if one were to define such a right,
who would pay for it? (Of course, some portions of this right would be essentially
free. For example, Dorothy Roberts' positive right to information necessary to rem-
edy oppression would cost nothing within the context of an already established gov-
ernment-supported family planning program). Second, would the resulting tax
system, with the accompanying massive redistribution of societal resources, itself be
oppressive? See generally Eps'EN, supra note 109 (arguing that inequitable and
inefficient redistribution of societal resources should itself be a constitutional viola-
tion and advocating the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a second-best patch-
work substitute for the definition of such a constitutional right). See discussion
supra text accompanying notes 109-18.
In any event, as stated earlier, this article is not intended to construct such a
theory of positive constitutional rights. Rather, this article argues that when the
government specifically bases a denial of government funding on the exercise of a
previously defined fundamental constitutional right, which results in harm to the
would-be recipient, such government imposed suffering should be held to violate that
constitutional right if, in the same circumstances, a government fine, penalty, or
burden would. One does not, contrary to the Supreme Court's view, see, e.g., Harris,
448 U.S. at 317-18, have to construct such a positive right to government deliverance
from abject suffering or, even more narrowly, a positive right from government-im-
posed abject suffering, to reach this conclusion. Rather, government should not be
able to, by denial of government aid, impose suffering, much less abject suffering, as
a way of attacking a previously defined fundamental constitutional right which al-
ready protects citizens from government imposed harm.
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the recipient's poverty. The poor suffer, the Supreme Court argues,
not because the government denies them funding but because they
are poor.' 55 With astounding ease, the Supreme Court thus dis-
misses the government's intentional imposition of suffering as the
kind of victimless crime in which there is not only no victim, but no
criminal. The would-be victim, who is denied funding, "voluntarily
agreed" to her suffering in order to retain her constitutional
right. 156 The government, which denied her hungry children other-
wise available government aid solely because it disfavored the
mother's procreative choices, somehow bears no responsibility, even
though the government acted with full knowledge of, indeed even
exploited, the misery that denial of relief would effectuate.1
5 7
The argument is an extraordinary trompe l'oeil. Welfare bene-
ficiaries who are denied benefits because of a disfavored exercise of
a constitutional right suffer not just because they are poor, but be-
cause the government expressly denied them relief from their pov-
erty that would have been available had they marched in step to
the government's conception of morality. To argue that somehow
the government's refusal of subsistence aid does not contribute to
their suffering requires a certain kind of emotional blindness that
only lawyers seem able to achieve. If the law is to be even mini-
mally consistent, such intentional imposition of suffering on the
least fortunate members of society designed to affect their exercise
of a constitutional right must surely invoke some constitutional
protection of the right. Whether the government's club is a fine or a
denial of funding, both decisions should be constitutionally
suspect.158
155. See, e.g., Maher, 432 U.S. at 479 (stating that "we certainly are not unsympa-
thetic to the plight of an indigent woman who desires an abortion but 'the Constitu-
tion does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill'" (citation
omitted)). See also Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 (arguing that the harm suffered by a
woman who has been unable to have a medically necessary abortion was the result
of her poverty and not the government's exclusion of funding for abortion from other-
wise available Medicaid funding for medically necessary procedures).
156. This appears to perhaps be the same way in which the Reagan Administra-
tion argued that the homeless volunteered to be homeless because they did not wish
to move into crime-, vermin-, and filth-infested homeless shelters. See Reagan Cites
'Choice" by Homeless: Shelter Available, President Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1988,
at A8.
157. Additionally, Cass Sunstein argues that the government's past practices are
significantly responsible for poverty itself, which he argues is largely the result of
government decisions to protect certain types of entitlement, such as property, and
not others, such as the right of a homeless person to use available shelter. Accord-
ingly, he argues, the government should be recognized as having a broader responsi-
bility to ameliorate poverty that its actions have largely caused. See generally
SUNsTEiN, supra note 18.
158. There is an argument that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine simply
demarcates appropriate lines of public and private authority. That is, the individual
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C. A Proposal: Harm-Based Analysis
Part of the reason for the failure of doctrine and scholarship to
focus on harm to the individual as the basis for analyzing the con-
stitutionality of government conditions on benefits is that both doc-
trine and scholarship are trapped by the classical conception of the
unconstitutional conditions problem as a bargaining problem; the
government, in placing conditions on government benefits, offers to
give benefits if the individual will relinquish his or her constitu-
tional right. Under this view, the constitutional question is to de-
termine whether this bargain between the individual and the state
is enforceable.159 Using this false contracts conceptualization leads
the analyst to focus on misleading issues, such as whether the indi-
vidual's consent to the government contract was voluntary or co-
erced. If the individual's assent was coerced, such as by undue
dependence upon the government benefit, then, the argument goes,
the condition may be unconstitutional.1 6 0 If not, then the individ-
ual has voluntarily waived the constitutional right. Other resulting
questions are whether the bargain between the government and the
individual is unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy, or
whether the bargain is unconscionable.16 1
However, instead of this bargaining analysis, one might con-
ceptualize the rights-affecting benefit conditions as an oppression
problem. The core difficulty would then be neither defects in a hy-
pothetical bargaining process between the individual and the state
nor the negative social externalities that flow from bargains that
ignore harms to third parties. Rather, the core issue would be
may have a right to make a private value choice for abortion, but that right stops
when the individual asks the go-4ernment to pay for the exercise of the right. Simi-
larly, the individual has no claim on the government to pay the expenses of rearing
children, even though she has the right to decide to bear a child. This is essentially
the argument that the Suprenie Court made in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980), Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1976), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
However, what this analysis fails to recognize is that the individual's claim to the
government's purse comes not from a right to funding per se, but a right to require
the government not to allocate funding on the basis of her exercise of a constitutional
right.
159. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 109; Sullivan, supra note 22. Cass Sun-
stein is one exception, however, in that he examines the unconstitutional conditions
question primarily as a question of the allocation of government power. See discus-
sion supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
160. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 22 (discussing the problems with using coer-
cion as a theory of unconstitutional conditions). See also discussion supra note 138.
161. See, e.g., Suliivan, supra noe 22 Warguing that onnttuti~a condtimns
are those that, despite the agreement of the rightsholder and the state, should be
invalidated because of systemic consequences that arise from the exercise of these
rights); Bogle, supra note 106.
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whether government harms individuals for exercising constitu-
tional rights.
The reason why harm-focused analysis is more helpful than a
bargaining analysis for understanding rights-affecting benefits con-
ditions is that harm focus is indeed the analysis originally underly-
ing the constitutional right. In analyzing whether the government
violated an individual's constitutional right, one ordinarily does not
ask whether the government breached a bargain with the individ-
ual not to violate her constitutional right. One asks whether the
government deprived the individual of her constitutional right or
otherwise harmed the individual because of the exercise of her con-
stitutional right. If so, the government's action violates the right
regardless of any agreement by the individual.162 Of course, one
could conceptualize government placement of disincentives on con-
stitutional rights as a draconian contract, in which the government
agrees, for instance, not to imprison a person if she agrees not to
exercise her constitutional right to free speech or to procreate. In-
stead, the usual argument is that the government harms her or, in
Supreme Court parlance, burdens or penalizes her, for the exercise
of the constitutional right.163 The harm, in this example, the im-
prisonment, is seen as the problem. The government harms indi-
viduals to attack their state-disfavored exercise of a constitutional
right, and thus improperly interferes with those individuals' free-
dom to exercise their rights without government interference. It is
irrelevant whether the injured individuals accepted the govern-
ment's terms or not, that is, whether they spoke or procreated
freely or relinquished the right to speak or to procreate in order to
162. Thus, a fine for exercising a fundamental right is still unconstitutional even
if the individual agrees to forego the right to avoid the fine, unless the government
justifies its -action by a compelling interest. There are reasons for this. As stated
earlier, ordinarily government cannot physically prevent an individual from exercis-
ing the right. Thus, the government cannot physically prevent an individual from
speaking or procreating, except perhaps by such drastic measures as cutting out
tongues or sterilization. Instead, the government can affect constitutional rights
only indirectly by harming individuals, after the fact, for exercising the right. Thus,
the government may imprison a person who utters disfavored speech or makes state-
disfavored childbearing choices. However, none of these tactics will prevent the per-
son from speaking or procreating if she is determined to do so. Nonetheless, by plac-
ing a disincentive on the speech or procreation the government can hope to dissuade
the person from exercising the right.
163. Epstein argues that this is an illegitimate bargain because the government is
bargaining with what it does not have, that is, the right to imprison an individual.
See EPsTEiN, supra note 109, at 40-41. However, whether the government has the
"right" to imprison a person, it certainly has the power to imprison a person, and it is
this power with which it is bargaining. Here, the constitutional right provides that
the government cannot use that power or otherwise harm, penalize, or burden a per-
son for the decision to exercise a constitutional right.
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stay out of jail. The government harm for exercising the constitu-
tionally-protected right violated the right.
Strangely, when the analysis shifts from traditional burdens
or penalties, such as fines or imprisonment, to conditions on govern-
ment benefits, suddenly the analytical structure shifts from torts to
contracts. The question becomes whether or not the individual has
or has not made a valid bargain with the state to freely relinquish
her constitutional right in exchange for the government benefit, to
which some scholars answer yes, others no. But the question
should be, why, all of a sudden, has the discussion become about
contracts at all? If it is improper to harm an individual by impris-
oning her or fining her for the exercise of her constitutional right,
and if consent to the imprisonment or fine will not cure a constitu-
tional problem,164 why is it considered to be a simple contractual
matter when the state harms an individual by depriving her of a
government benefit because of her exercise of a constitutional right?
A cynic might suggest that the conventional analysis shifts to
contracts when the problem shifts to funding restrictions because
contracts analysis posits an arms-length, bargained-for exchange
between parties of equivalent status (although not necessarily
equal bargaining power). This facilitates approval of the naked op-
pression that results when those who have, such as the state, give
to those who need, such as welfare recipients, only on terms
favorable to the giver. Where a harm-based analysis would see the
terms as a problematic abuse of power, a contract-based analysis
assumes a valid bargained-for exchange between someone who has
(the state) and someone who needs (the welfare recipient). The wel-
fare recipient has no right to what the state has. Therefore, the
welfare recipient must take what she can get, upon whatever terms
it is offered, and be grateful for it. Such a shift in the analytical
structure permits the rich to keep both their wealth and their con-
stitutional rights, while requiring the poor to surrender constitu-
tional rights to obtain relief from destitution.16 5
Even without cynicism one can question why government vio-
lations of constitutional rights through "takings" should be so
sharply different from government violations of constitutional
rights through "refusals to give." Both government "takings" and
"refusals to give," if linked to the exercise of a constitutional right,
harm an individual because of her exercise of her constitutional
164. Thus, a government decision to affirmatively pay for people not to have chil-
dren would probably be considered to be a violation of the right to procreate.




right. An individual who does not receive a government benefit
solely because she has exercised her constitutional right in a state-
disfavored way is harmed by the government. She is no less
harmed because she had no antecedent right to the government
benefit. Indeed, because she is bereft of other resources and de-
pends upon government alms, she may be harmed more than a
wealthy person would be disadvantaged by a small fine, or, qua Ep-
stein, by a disproportionate redistribution of property through tax
and spend policies. She is harmed because she has in fact lost
something, that is, a government benefit. Moreover, her constitu-
tional right is implicated because her loss is the result of her choice
to exercise her constitutional right.166 Once one focuses on the
harm to the individual for exercising her constitutional right, one
should clearly recognize that such harm is as constitutionally prob-
lematic as the loss of property or of liberty.
Of course, one might argue that government-imposed harm by
refusal to subsidize a right should be treated differently than gov-
ernment harm imposed by a fine or a penalty on the right because
subsidies of rights require government to supply funds, whereas
fines or penalties do not.16 7 When the government is asked to com-
mit resources it is important to protect the public purse and to as-
sure that resource-allocative decisions are made in a democratically
responsible manner. Accordingly, the government, and particularly
the legislature, must be free to allocate resources on any basis that
it sees fit, even if such allocations adversely affect rights.
At some level, the argument about the government's need to
democratically allocate resources makes sense. Obviously, resource
allocation decisions require fundamental social judgments that
seem quintessentially for legislative or executive rather than judi-
ial determination. Howvever, there must be limits on government
discretion to make resource-allocative decisions. For example, if to-
morrow, through some bizarre convergence of public hysteria and
myopia, the legislature voted to give all government resources to
one person, say Ross Perot, to distribute as he saw fit, there cer-
tainly would be constitutional problems. Accordingly, government
allocation of benefits is not completely immune from judicial consti-
166. An analogy might be made to sexual harassment. Here, the employee has a
cause of action for sexual harassment even if she consents to the sexual pressure to
keep her job. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (per-
mitting Title VII action for workplace sexual harassment if employer's sexual ad-
vances were unwelcome, evee if plaintiff voluntarily "consented" to the advances).
The bargain does not excuse the harm, i.e., the employer's misuse of power by requir-
ing sexual favors as a condition of employment.
167. Fines and penalties do not require the government to supply funds, except to
fund the bureaucracy needed to enforce the penalties.
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tutional scrutiny.1es Rather, the question is, to what extent does
the Constitution limit the government's power to allocate the public
purse? More particularly, why should government funding deci-
sions that expressly disfavor the exercise of a constitutional right
be permissible when the government cannot otherwise act to ad-
versely affect the constitutional right?169 In other words, although
the government generally should have broad authority to allocate
resources, there is no governmental authority that should override
the otherwise constitutionally protected value choices of
individuals.
Another counter to the harm by government denial of funding
argument is practical. A focus on harm from government funding
decisions would prevent government from making any funding deci-
sions that adversely affect constitutional rights, since such deci-
sions technically harm the individual by denying her government
benefits. For example, any governmental funding decision that
simply fails to include funding of a constitutional right can be con-
strued to harm an individual because of her exercise of that right.
Thus, a government decision to fund whale research, which by neg-
ative implication does not fund snail research, may be viewed as
harmful to snail-researchers because of their First Amendment
freedom of speech decision to research snails, not whales. The gov-
ernment obviously must make simple allocative decisions, such as
to fund whale research but not snail research. Thus, government
arguably must have discretion to allocate funds in a manner that
adversely affects a constitutional right. Otherwise, the govern-
ment, in order to make any funding decision that impacts a consti-
tutional right, would be constitutionally obligated to fund all
constitutional rights.170
This argument is incorrect, however. Prohibiting government
harm to an individual because of her exercise of a constitutional
right would not mean that the government must therefore fund the
exercise of all constitutional rights. A government refusal to fund
the constitutional right would only be constitutionally problematic
if the government refusal to fund the constitutional right is specifi-
cally linked to the exercise of the constitutional right.
A few examples might clarify the distinction. Sometimes the
government simply excludes a broad category of activity that hap-
168. See, e.g., SUNSTEiN, supra note 18, at 294-96.
169. Of course, this is to be distinguished from neutral criteria that may inciden-
tally aflett the exercise of the coustitutional right.
170. See Sullivan, supra note 22, at 1501 (arguing that "incidental" government
rights-affecting conditions should be permitted because otherwise government would
be able to make only unrestricted grants). See also Kreimer, supra note 106.
1995]
Law and Inequality
pens to include some constitutionally protected conduct. Thus, the
government might decide to fund medical procedures but exclude
discretionary medical procedures such as cosmetic surgery. The
fact that the discretionary category includes non-medically neces-
sary abortions does not mean that the government's failure to fund
abortions infringes upon the woman's constitutional right to an
abortion.1 71 Although the decision harms the woman by denying
her funding for abortion, the harm does not result because she de-
cided to have an abortion. Rather, she was denied funding because
she chose a discretionary medical procedure, which happened to be
an abortion. Accordingly, such a refusal to, fund is not really linked
to, and thus should not be held to implicate, the constitutional
right. 172
In other cases, the government does not affirmatively exclude
any activity from funding, it simply decides to include funding of
other activities. Thus, the government might decide to fund rain
171. This would be true even if the general medical-assistance government fund-
ing program included pregnancy and childbirth, but not abortion-the funding dis-
tinction that is usually assumed to cause the primary constitutional problems in the
Medicaid abortion funding cases. To understand this better, imagine a program in
which the government decides to find solely prenatal care for poor women. Here,
the government simply establishes a priority to fund prenatal care and exclude all
other activities, not just abortion. Thus, the government refuses to fund abortion
because it is not prenatal care, not because it is abortion. This should be considered
simply a rights-neutral allocation of government resources, even though the effect is
to privilege one exercise of a constitutional right, childbearing, over another, "not
childbearing," including abortion. The fact that childbirth assistance is a small part
of a larger medical assistance program does not weaken this argument, indeed it
may strengthen it. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the govern-
ment's decision to fund non-medically necessary abortions did not violate the recipi-
ent's constitutional right to an abortion); Hope v. Perales, 83 N.Y.2d 563 (1994)
(holding that a state law that provided prenatal and post partum care to poor wo-
men, but did not fund abortion, did not violate the New York State Constitution).
But see SuNsTEin, supra note 18, at 315-18 (arguing that the U.S. Constitution as a
matter of substantive due process should be interpreted to require government to
fund abortions for poor women in the case of rape or incest).
172. An exception here might be where the government intentionally used this
more general category as a way of targeting abortion. In such a case, the govern-
ment's hostility to the woman's right to an abortion links the funding decision to the
right and thus would implicate the right. See Minneapolis Star Tribune & Company
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-580 (1983) (discussing Grosjean
v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936), which invalidated a general Louisiana
tax on large newspapers where all but one of the newspapers had "ganged up" on
Huey Long and in which the Governor had advocated a general tax as a tax on "ly-
ing" newspapers; the Court in Grosjean further stated that the tax was a "deliber-
ate" and "calculated" device in the form of a tax to limit the circulation of information
to which the public was constitutionally entitled). An alternative argument is that
there is an implicit constitutional right of poor people to government funding for the
exercise of some constitutional rights; however, one does not have to make this argu-
ment to conclude that some selective government funding should be unconstitu-
tional. See discussion supra note 23 and text accompanying notes 168-69.
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forest protection. This decision should not implicate, say, the right
to abortion, merely because the government funds rain forests and
not abortions. Obviously, the government must be able to decide
how to best use scarce governmental resources. The fact that the
government decides to include funding of one category of activity
does not imply that it is constitutionally obligated to fund others
simply because the other activity is constitutionally protected.17 3
What is constitutionally problematic, however, is when the govern-
ment specifically excludes the exercise of a constitutional right from
funding. Thus, the government may decide to fund medically nec-
essary procedures, but exclude medically necessary abortion.174
Such government decisions target the constitutional right. These
decisions are not justified by the government's need to allocate re-
sources. The need to allocate does not imply that one must allocate
on the basis of a constitutional right. If the government is setting
funding priorities, one might ask, Why not use a rights-neutral al-
173. Supplemental income programs, such as unemployment compensation and
government disability payments may be in this category. Supplemental income pro-
grams generally apply only to persons who are unable to work, either because they
cannot find work (unemployment compensation programs) or are physically unable
to work (government disability programs). Persons who voluntarily choose not to
work are not eligible. Because the Thirteenth Amendment provides a constitutional
right not to work, these programs might arguably be a "refusal to fund" a constitu-
tional right on the basis of the exercise of the right. However, here as well, the
government simply makes a priority decision to fund persons who are unable to
work. All people who are able to work, including those who are working and those
who voluntarily are not, are excluded from funding. Thus, whether an individual
chooses to work or not, that individual is still ineligible for aid. This distinction may
seem like hairsplitting, but it is the legislative line. Here, Congress has denied fund-
ing on the basis of an individual's ability to work, and not on the basis of whether the
able individual exercises her constitutional right not to work.
The workfare program and learnfare programs are more problematic because
with these programs the government clearly denies need-based aid because of a con-
stitutional right (assuming a constitutional right to refuse work or to choose not to
be educated). Thus, with workfare and learnfare, if one works or goes to school, one
gets aid; if one refuses to work or go to school, one is denied aid. However, the
workfare program might be construed as simply implementing the same rights-neu-
tral "ability to work" requirement as unemployment compensation programs. That
is, because welfare is need-based aid, refusal to work, as opposed to inability to work,
might be conceptualized as lack of need.
The problem with workfare programs, however, is that the work requirements
often go beyond eligibility requirements and actually seek to require welfare recipi-
ents to work. Thus, the programs may impose punitive sanctions such as reducing
aid for failure to work rather than simply defining welfare eligibility to exclude those
who have available work. The former would seem to be government harm imposed
because of the exercise of a constitutional right. Learnfare similarly denies a benefit
on the basis of the exercise of a constitutional right (assuming, again, a constitu-
tional right to choose not to be educated), and thus may be rights-violative. Instead,
the government perhaps should provide better funding for education rather than
punitive sanctions.
174. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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locative basis?175 In such cases, the government harms people not
by simply refusing to fund their constitutional right; instead, the
government harms people by refusing to fund their constitutional
right because of their exercise of the right. Such decisions to allo-
cate government funds on the basis of the exercise of a constitu-
tional right should be presumptively unconstitutional as a direct
prohibition, fine, or penalty on the right would be. That is, it should
be unconstitutional for government to deny funding expressly on
-the basis of the exercise of a constitutional right unless the govern-
ment has a compelling reason for doing so.
One limited exception might be when the government must
make rights-based funding decisions. An example is a government
program that exclusively funds constitutionally protected activity.
The government might decide to fund research, or university educa-
tion, or the arts. Here, all funded activity in the program is consti-
tutionally protected. Accordingly, any further narrowing line that
the government draws must necessarily allocate upon the basis of a
constitutional right. Thus, unless the government funds all re-
search or all university education or all artistic activity or none at
all, it cannot avoid drawing narrowing, rights-based lines.
The whale/snail research problem also falls within this cate-
gory. 176 Once the government sets out to fund research of any sort,
unless the government funds all research, no matter where the gov-
ernment draws the allocative line, at whales, snails, marine biol-
ogy, or whatever, it necessarily allocates on the basis of a
constitutional right-the right to select one's own research topic. 17 7
175. The Court's recent decision inRosenberger supports this view. See Rosenber-
ger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (hold-
ing that the University of Virginia could not constitutionally exclude a student
organization's Christian newspaper from funding that the university extended to
other student organization publications).
176. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
177. This analysis also takes care of the Supreme Court's oft quoted problem of
funding for programs of democracy. The Supreme Court takes the position that
overturning government refusals to subsidize would mean that the government
would be required to fund research into communism if it sought to fund research into
democracy. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). However, this is an ex-
ample of the situation in which the government seeks exclusively to fund constitu-
tionally protected activity. This program exclusively funds a constitutionally
protected activity-political science research. Here, once the government decides to
fund any research program, any narrowing line that the government draws will allo-
cate on the basis of First Amendment rights. Thus, government generally should be
permitted to draw the line at research that it believes is appropriate for it to pro-
mote. However, this does not mean that any rights-affecting line that government
draws is necessarily permissible. Thus, the government might draft a proposal to
fund university programs in animal behavior, but only on the condition that such
programs do not engage in research in snail behavior. The fact that prioritizing be-
tween animal behavior and other research may be a legitimate reason to adversely
[Vol. 14:1
AND THE POOR HAVE CHILDREN
Another example is a government decision to fund prenatal care for
pregnant women. Here, the government chooses to exclusively fund
constitutionally protected activity: the decision to have children.
Yet a decision to fund prenatal care, by negative implication, denies
funding to people who choose to adopt children or have abortions.
The very decision to fund prenatal care draws an allocative line on
the basis of the exercise of a constitutional right. However, unless
the government decides to fund all childbearing decisions, it must
make some allocative choice, and any allocative choice it makes,
short of universal funding for all childbearing decisions, is going to
negatively impact the exercise of a constitutional right. In this lim-
ited category of cases, then, the government's decision must be
rights-based or government may not fund at all. To best protect the
constitutional rights of individuals, the government should perhaps
draw lines in a manner that least impairs the values protected by
the constitutional right. Since any allocative decision violates the
constitutional right here, any government decision that has some
legitimate basis is probably sound.178
When the subject matter of the government funding includes
both protected and non-protected activity, however, the government
has a choice to draw allocative lines on some basis other than the
exercise of a constitutional right. In this context, it should be rea-
sonable to require the government, given a choice, to do so; if, in-
stead, the government insists on drawing rights-based allocative
affect the exercise of a constitutional right does not mean that specifically excluding
a limited research topic must necessarily be. These types of government funding
decisions are particularly difficult to analyze because the government is in effect
treading in a mine field, that is, any decision it reaches will adversely affect rights.
The Court's recent decision in Rosenberger involved a funding criterion of this type.
See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510
(1995) (striking down a state university's decision to exclude a Christian student
newspaper from general university funding for student organization publications).
See also Cole, supra note 110 (arguing that constitutional restrictions on govern-
ment funded speech should be analyzed as establishing institutional "spheres of neu-
trality" in which social values of fostering public deliberation require government
neutrality with respect to funding conditions).
178. Professor Sunstein argues that any impact on rights by denial of a benefit
should be permissible, unless the right requires government neutrality, if supported
by a legitimate government interest. SuNsTEIN, supra note 18, at 304-05. His stan-
dard may suffice when the government has no choice but to violate the right or aban-
don the aid program altogether, but in other cases where the government has a
choice between impairing rights and not impairing rights, his legitimate interest
standard does not adequately protect rights. A government decision to impair rights
should be treated the same as direct regulation of the right. In many ways this
argument is for consistency, that is, once the Court establishes a fundamental right
against direct regulatory activity, all government funding decisions that harm per-
sons because of the exercise of that right should be equally suspect because they




lines, it should expect those lines to be subject to the same level of
scrutiny as any other rights-based government action.
Even more problematic are rights-hostile government denials
of funding on the basis of the exercise of a constitutional right.
Such denials are not really allocative decisions at all. The govern-
ment uses denials of funding as a regulatory tool to disadvantage
the exercise of a constitutional right. That is, many government
refusals to fund are not positive decisions to allocate scarce re-
sources to higher-priority projects, but rather are negative decisions
to exclude from funding the exercise of a constitutional right be-
cause of government hostility to the exercise of that right. These
types of government funding decisions clearly raise the same kind
of constitutional issue concerning government intrusions into con-
stitutionally protected activity as do direct fines or penalties on the
activity.
An example is found in the Medicaid funding for abortions
case, Harris v. McRae,179 in which the government generally
funded medically necessary procedures but refused to fund medi-
cally necessary abortions. There was no necessity for the govern-
ment decision to draw the allocative line at the doorstep of a
constitutional right. Indeed, there was really no allocative basis for
this government decision. Funding medically necessary abortions
would have saved the government the Medicaid expenses of a full-
term, medically-risky pregnancy.lSO The government excluded
179. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
180. One frequently made argument is that refusing to fund abortions is justified
by a "conscientious objector" rationale that permits the government to constitution-
ally refuse to fund activities that a portion of the taxpaying public object to on moral
or religious grounds, even if the denial of funding would otherwise violate the consti-
tutional right. Under this view, such "conscientious objections" constitute a suffi-
ciently strong governmental interest to negate whatever constitutional problem
flows from the rights-based denial of funding. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 115;
SUNsTEIN, supra note 18, at 305-16; EPsTErN, supra note 109, at 291-94.
The conscientious objector argument should not justify violations of constitu-
tional rights. First, the forum for accommodating individual preferences concerning
appropriate funding is the legislative process and, accordingly, should be subject to
the same constitutional constraints that otherwise bind the legislative process.
Since constitutional abortion rights are a check on the power of the legislature as a
whole to impose individual moral preferences on others, these individual preferences
should not override otherwise applicable constitutional limits on legislation.
Even if taxpayer moral preferences were relevant on free exercise or other
grounds, it is misleading to suggest that an individual taxpayer's tax will "pass
through" to a particular program, say abortion funding, rather than defense spend-
ing; taxes are pooled and then distributed to government programs. Accordingly, an
individual taxpayer's claim that she or he is directly funding any particular govern-
ment program seems strained at best.
Moreover, even if preferences were significant, they should not be strong enough
to authorize an imposition of harm upon rightsholders simply to accommodate the
moral objections of those who essentially disagree with the protection afforded under
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abortions from funding because it sought to discourage poor women
from having abortions, even if their health was at risk.181 Such a
rights-hostile government decision to harm a person by denying her
funding solely because she plans to use the funding to subsidize a
government-disfavored constitutional right should be treated ex-
actly as would direct regulation of the constitutional right18 2
However, even if the government's goal is not naked hostility
to the exercise of a constitutional right, a government decision to
expressly exclude a constitutional right from funding should be pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, unless the government has no choice
but to affect the right. Such a government decision harms individu-
als because of their decisions to exercise constitutional rights and
should be treated like all other government actions that harm indi-
viduals because of the exercise of constitutional rights. Only a com-
the right. An analogue would be refusing interracial couples marital deductions or
Soial Security spousal benefits because some taxpayeTs tlaim to have mrAl ur eti-
gious objections to interracial marriage.
181. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 315 (upholding Hyde Amendment denying federal
funding for medically necessary abortions except to save the life of the mother).
182. The government programs in Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360
(1988), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), would appear problematic under
this analysis. The Supreme Court in Lyng upheld a statutory provision that denied
food stamps to striking workers even though workers who had voluntarily quit work
for other reasons were eligible for benefits. 485 U.S. at 372. However, such a pro-
gram clearly harmed workers by denying them eligibility for food stamps solely on
the basis of their exercise of their apparent constitutional right to strike and thus
should be subject to the same level of scrutiny as other statutes burdening or penal-
izing the right to strike. This analysis assumes, of course, that there is a constitu-
tional right to strike and that striking workers otherwise would have been eligible
for food stamps. Obviously, if there is no constitutional right to strike, then the Lyng
restrictions would not pose constitutional problems. Lyng petitioners raised First
Amendment associational rights to unionize and free speech rights to express them-
selves about union matters. However, these interests do not necessarily support a
constitutional right to express these interests through strikes. See Baker, supra
note 108, at 1221-22 (arguing that there was no constitutional right to strike at
stake in Lyng).
Rust v. Sullivan is also problematic. There, the Supreme Court upheld a gov-
ernment regulation which clearly harmed Title X recipients by preveating the clinics
and doctors from giving clinic clients information about abortion. As in Lyng, the
government excluded program recipients from otherwise available funding solely on
the basis of their exercise of a constitutional right-namely, a First Amendment
right to give medical information to patients. Again, this assumes the constitutional
right is protected here. Thus, the Rust restrictions might be analyzed as a time,
place, and manner restriction oi free expression since the doctors could offer coun-
seling about abortion outside of the Title X programs. However, time, place, and
ma ner restrictions e, as a rule, Content-neutral and based upon %avernment ad-
ministrative concerns, which the abortion counseling restriction was not. See Rob-
erts, supra note 74 (arguing io favor of a substantive government obligation to
provide poor women information for their own liberation).
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pelling legislative justification for the imposition of such harm
should suffice. 183
One might argue that invalidating government refusals to
subsidize that harm individuals because of their exercise of a con-
stitutional right requires government to spend additional funds.
However, overturning harmful government funding decisions does
not necessarily require government to expend additional funds, it
merely requires government to draw different allocational lines.
Thus, the government could remedy the problem by eliminating the
benefit altogether or by drawing non-rights-based lines. Of course
in some cases, legislative majorities may not approve funding pro-
grams without the rights-offensive criteria. 184 However, such legis-
lative difficulty may support invalidation because it may indicate a
legislative bias against the constitutional rights of program benefi-
ciaries rather than a genuine legislative purpose to enact socially
desirable policies.
Additionally, one might argue that forbidding government to
adopt benefit allocations that harm individuals because of the exer-
cise of constitutional rights would improperly mandate government
neutrality regarding constitutionally-protected value choices, which
would impermissibly handicap the government from effectively leg-
islating in the social interest.18 5 That is, the government must
have some permissible tools to encourage individuals to exercise
their rights in a socially-productive rather than socially-destructive
manner. Indeed, the government regularly legislates incentives for
individuals to make government-favored choices instead of govern-
ment-disfavored choices. Tax policy is an obvious example of the
government structuring laws to favor or disfavor certain types of
activity.186 No one would reasonably argue that the Constitution
completely precludes the government from using its tax or benefit
allocation authority to encourage socially productive behavior. 187
183. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (concluding that
the federal government's refusal to subsidize racially discriminatory religious
schools by granting them a charitable tax exemption implicated the school's right to
religious freedom and thus triggered strict scrutiny, but holding that the restriction
was justified by the state's compelling governmental interest in combatting racism).
184. Recent difficulties in passing health care legislation that also covers abor-
tions is an example of this problem. See, e.g., The Health Care Debate: The Abortion
Issue, N.Y. TNmEs, July 14, 1994, at Al.
185. See generally Sunstein, supra note 22. Of course, if the government's social
interest is compelling, the government could constitutionally make such benefit allo-
cations anyway. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
186. The use of charitable tax deductions to encourage charitable donations is an
example of such a legislative tax incentive.
187. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 22.
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This argument has some persuasive force. Of course, often
government incentive programs do not disfavor the exercise of a
constitutional right. However, even when government allocations
do disfavor constitutionally protected rights, some community in-
terests, short of compelling interests, may justify permitting the
government to encourage citizens to exercise rights in socially pro-
ducti-e ways. For example, teenage pregnancy is obviously a sig-
nificant social problem. Teenagers, children themselves, have
difficulty providing satisfactory emotional and financial support to
their children.188 Teenage parents' frequent inability to properly
rear their children strains the fabric of the society considerably,
which often must support those children through the welfare and
social services system. Such procreative decisions also may cause
increased crime and other antisocial behavior if immature teenage
parents fail to give their offspring adequate social survival skills.
Accordingly, the government should arguably have some means to
influence teenagers to postpone childbearing.189 To argue other-
wise would improperly require absolute neutrality from the govern-
ment with respect to constitutionally protected rights, even when
such constitutional rights do not demand government neutrality. 190
However, the fact that the legislature may disfavor teenage
pregnancy as social policy and thus seek to discourage it does not
mean that any government means to effectuate its policy choice are
necessarily valid. Rather, as rights doctrine recognizes, govern-
mental means that harm or injure an individual to promote or influ-
ence "responsible" or socially-desirable exercises of constitutional
rights are presumptively invalid and may be justified only if the
government's social interest is compelling.191 Although the Consti-
tution does not require absolute neutrality with respect to constitu-
tionally-protected -value choices, the Constitution prohibits
government from using harmful or oppressive means to implement
its social policies.
Certainly, some governmental means to discourage socially
troublesome behavior should be permissible. A public education
188. See discussion supra note 13. See also Katherine M. Waters, Judicial Con-
sent to Abort: Assessing a Minor's Maturity, 54 Gao. WASH. L. Rv. 90 (1985) (dis-
cussing research concerning emotional and parenting problems of teenage parents).
189. These arguments are undercut somewhat in the benefit allocation context
because the government limits its policies to program beneficiaries and does not ap-
ply them to the population at large. Thus, the government may challenge a decision
by an impoverished teenage welfare recipient to have a fourth child out of wedlock
while permitting an upper mddle dss teenager tc subsidize her Cb1d thraugh fa -
ily tax exemptions.
190. See discussion supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
191. See discussion supra part II.B.
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campaign, for example, to encourage children not to have children
would certainly seem permissible. Imprisonment of teenage par-
ents is clearly impermissible. Conditioning access to government
benefits on an individual's decision to forego constitutionally-pro-
tected procreative value choices should not fall within the category
of appropriate governmental means. This type of intrusive govern-
ment benefits allocation, as opposed to other non-harmful govern-
ment action such as public information campaigns, harms or
injures the individual for her exercise of the right to procreate just
as direct government regulation would and therefore should be an
invalid use of government power.
In sum, a constitutionally problematic funding condition is one
in which the government harms an individual by denying her gov-
ernment funding because of her exercise of a constitutional right.
Such a condition should be problematic regardless of hostile legisla-
tive intent to affect the exercise of the right, although such hostile
intent should certainly suffice. Rather, the key inquiry should be
whether the government has in fact harmed an individual expressly
on the basis of the individual's exercise of the right.
V. The Harm-Based Analysis and Family Cap Plans
Using a harm-focused analysis, one can see more clearly why
family cap plans should be unconstitutional. They are govern-
ment's imposition of harm to influence the childbearing choices of
welfare recipients. The very definition of a fundamental constitu-
tional right to procreative choice imposes limits on the govern-
ment's ability to affect these rights by direct prohibition or by harm
to individuals for their exercise of the right. The right to make
childbearing decisions demarcates areas of private choices where
basic personal value choices and lifestyle decisions are protected
from government harm.
Underlying the protection of fundamental procreative rights is
a normative choice that these decisions are ones that should be
committed to the private sphere rather than to the public one. That
is, a necessary attribute of citizenship is that one carries the right
to make, without government interference, certain fundamental
choices about matters that are important to one's life. Thus, the
Supreme Court has described the decision to bear or beget a child
as the essence of the right to privacy.192
192. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) ("if the right
to privacy means anything, it means the right to be free of unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
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A. Harm Analysis and Traditional Procreative Rights
In the abortion and contraceptive decisions, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Constitution to delegate moral procreative
choices to the individual rather than to the state. The Constitution,
as thus interpreted, creates laissez-faire zones where individuals'
private moral choices prevail over those of the state (or, perhaps
put another way, of legislative majorities).193
Even the Court's roundly criticized decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick 194 recognizes that some procreative decisions are private
moral choices protected from government intrusion. The Bowers
Court refused to protect private sexual conduct, traditionally cul-
turally and legally proscribed,195 and concluded that moral regula-
tion of such conduct was within the permissible legislative
sphere.196 However, the Bowers Court also recognized that the
Constitution protects private procreative choices including the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget children. 197 Indeed, the Court char-
acterized previously defined fundamental rights, and thus by
implication the right to decide whether to bear or beget a child, as
"deeply rooted in the nation's tradition"'198 and "so essential to the
concept of ordered liberty that 'neither liberty nor justice' would ex-
ist if they were sacrificed."'199 Whether the Court correctly con-
cluded that such traditional "essential rights" are the only
fundamental rights protected under the Constitution, the Supreme
whether to bear or beget a child" (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972)).
193. An alternative theme in abortion cases grounds rights on bodily integrity
rather than moral choices. Problems arise, of course, where moral choices affect
other persons, which gives rise to a government interest in regulating the choice.
However, the strict scrutiny standard determines whether governmental interests
are sufficient to override the individual's fundamental rights.
194. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state law criminalizing sodomy). See also
Earl Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, n.95 (1990) (providing extensive list of articles
criticizing Bowers v. Hardwick),
195. Many objections can be made to the Court's view, not the least of which is to
question protecting private sexual choices less than private procreative choices, par-
ticularly given Griswold's emphasis on protecting private, consensual sexual activity
from state interference. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 617 (1965) (invalidating
state law outlawing contraception).
196. An additional issue raised by Bowers is that it fails to distinguish the ques-
tion of whether the community may develop community norms for private consen-
sual sexual conduct and enforce them by community sanctions, such as ostracism,
from the question of whether the community may use state power to force dissenters
to comply with those norms.
197. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (approving decisions conferring a fuidamental indi-
vidual right to decide whether to bear or beget a child).
198. Id. at 192 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
199. Id. at 191-92 (citing Palho v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
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Court's strong support for the right to decide whether to bear and
beget children confirms that such procreative decisions are consti-
tutionally committed to private choice and insulated from govern-
ment control.
The protection of private lifestyle and value choices with re-
spect to the right to bear children distinguishes procreative rights
from other economic constitutional rights that have often been the
subject of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Privacy rights
protect the individual's ability to make personal value choices. 2 00
The definition of the right to procreate protects individuals not
just against direct government prohibition of the right, but also
against the government harming an individual because of the exer-
cise of the constitutional right. Thus, the doctrine protects against
burdens on the right to procreate as well as upon direct prohibi-
tions. Except for Skinner v. Oklahoma,201 which involved forced
sterilization, the subsequent cases that protect the right to bear
and beget children all involved indirect government attacks on the
right through government policies that harmed individuals for
making procreative choices disfavored by government. In Griswold
v. Connecticut2 02 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,203 the Supreme Court
invalidated state statutes that criminalized the use and distribu-
tion of contraceptives and imposed a fine and/or jail term. The stat-
utes did not, indeed could not, prevent individuals from using
contraception if they could obtain it. Rather, the statutes imposed
subsequent harm, that is, fines and/or jail terms, for contraceptive
use.
Similarly, in the subsequent case Carey v. Population Serv-
ices,20 4 the Supreme Court invalidated statutes that did not
criminalize contraceptives but instead imposed regulatory restric-
tions on their use, such as requiring distribution by licensed phar-
macists. In Carey, the Court recognized that the statutes indirectly
harmed those who sought to use contraceptives not by criminalizing
their use, but by making the acquisition of contraceptives more ex-
pensive or inconvenient. The statutes, even less so than the crimi-
nal ones at issue in Griswold and Eisenstadt, did not prevent
people from exercising their constitutional right to decide to bear or
200. In contrast, rights that protect only economic interests are generally not sub-
ject to strict scrutiny. But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (using a
germaneness/reasonableness standard to invalidate the government's conditioning
of a permit on a partial taking of the applicant's property rights).
201. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
202. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
203. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
204. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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beget children. For example, people could easily obtain contracep-
tives by going to their local pharmacists. However, the Court held
even the relatively minor imposition of harm on individuals who
sought to obtain contraceptives to be sufficient to invalidate the
statute.
The procreation cases, in effect, illustrate the Supreme Court's
traditional burden or penalty concept. They exemplify the notion
that government violates a constitutional right if it imposes a bur-
den or a penalty on the exercise of the right, even if the individual
retains the ability to exercise the right.205
B. Analysis of Family Cap Proposals
In the context of statutes that refuse to support children born
while the mother is on welfare and supporting children born before
the mother joined the welfare rolls, the Supreme Court should rec-
ognize that once the obscuring language of burdens and subsidies is
stripped aside, the statutes are in effect the same as statutes that
would seek to impose fines or penalties on welfare mothers who
choose to bear children.2 0 6 In both cases, the government harms
the welfare mother by imposing a cost upon the family expressly
because of her decision to bear children while on welfare. Under
family cap proposals, the family that makes the disfavored choice is
expressly disadvantaged in relation to other similarly situated fam-
ilies that receive higher welfare payments because they chose to
bear their children born before they were welfare recipients. Wel-
fare families are thus harmed for their decisions to exercise their
procreative choices to decide when and whether to have children.
Moreover, the harm to welfare families, in real-life terms, is
frightening given the fact that, by definition, they are already desti-
tute. The denial of welfare benefits for additional children solely
because they are born while the family receives welfare can devas-
tate the family unit. Welfare payments to poor families already
205. See supra notes 60-69, 129 and accompanying text.
206. Family cap plans might arguably be analyzed as penalties under Supreme
Court doctrine, since the mother who has a child while receiving welfare will, after
the birth of the child, receive less aid per child then she did before the child was
born. However, under the analysis in Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (treating the
welfare family as a unit for equal protection purposes rather than treating each child
as a separate recipient), Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher, 432 U.S. 464
(1976), the Court would likely analyze these welfare statutes not as "penalties" but
as refusals to subsidize, since the government does not reduce the family's welfare
grant on the birth of the additional child but rather simply refuses to increase it. To
the extent that this means the family's economic condition is worsened, the response
under Harris and Maher would be that this worsened economic condition is not the
result of any government action, but rather is the "result of their poverty," a situa-
tion for which the government, the Court argues, is not responsible.
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provide only a portion of what children need.2 07 Moreover, welfare
payments over the last several years have significantly decreased
when adjusted for inflation.20s To take a family that is already de-
prived and to deprive them further can only exacerbate the nega-
tive problems associated with childhood poverty, including lowered
behavior and cognitive skills, augmented health problems, and re-
duced access to medical care. 2 09 The United States already has the
highest child poverty rate of the industrialized nations.2 10 Family
cap plans serve only to reduce the weak safety net provided to poor
children.2 1 The sole basis for the benefit denial is the procreative
choice of the mother.
207. States need not fully cover standard of need, and they generally do not. See
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(ii) (1993).
208. See Welfare Debate Driven by Half Truths, L.A. Tnmds, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al
[hereinafter Half Truths] (stating figures showing that welfare rates decreased sig-
nificantly in the 1980's after adjusting for inflation).
209. See Sandra E. Danziger & Sheldon Danziger, Child Poverty and Public Pol-
icy: Toward a Comprehensive Anti-Poverty Strategy, 122 DAEDULUS 57, 71-72 (1993).
210. Id. at 57 n.1. The Danzigers state that 20% of American children live in
poverty, compared with 9% in Canada and Australia and less than 2% in Sweden.
Moreover, 54.2% of American children in single parent families live in poverty, com-
pared with 37% in Canada and less than 2% in Sweden. Id. at Table 5. In addition,
the Danzigers urge that high American child poverty rates may be caused by a com-
bination of low wages and relatively high unemployment in the United States, and
the failure of the American "social safety net" to provide adequate relief from this
poverty. Id. at nn.1-20. Also, American policy in the 1980's shifted to divert safety
net resources away from the young and towards the elderly. See generally WILSON,
supra note 124 (arguing that large-scale structural changes in the economy have
created a socially isolated urban underclass with little opportunity for employment
and larger participation within the society, and advocating systemic economic
changes to promote economic growth and low unemployment).
211. Some argue that total welfare benefits, including food stamps, federal tax
earned income credit, Medicare, Medicaid, and child care are too high, in part be-
cause they may exceed the amount which one can earn from a minimum or low wage
job, thus providing a disincentive for welfare heads of household to seek low wage
employment. See, e.g., Welfare Trap or Net? Reformers, Recipients Fear Help That
Hurts, WASH. TIMms, Mar. 22, 1994, at C4. However, as stated earlier, these benefits
are generally well below the standard of need for welfare families. See supra note
207. Instead, some argue that the converse is probably true-that the minimum
wage is too low, miring low wage workers in poverty and thus depressing wage rates
for the population at large as well as increasing the burden on the welfare system.
For example, the current minimum wage of $4.25 per hour makes it impossible for
single parent families with only one wage earner, which happens to be the largest
proportion of welfare beneficiaries, to lift their families out of poverty by returning to
work. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 12, at 1305. Roberts advocates raising the mini-
mum wage as part of a welfare reform program that attacks poverty, rather than
welfare recipients. Id. at 1306. Her program would also include increased child
care, child support collection, education, and training for poor women. See also Half
Truths, supra note 208, at Al (noting that more than one-third of poor children
under age six live with single or married parents who work at least one full time job,
and profiling a welfare mother who quit a good job that paid nine dollars per hour
because child care costs, and lack of medical insurance, consumed so much of her
income that she could not afford to continue working).
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Such a benefit denial presumptively violates a welfare
mother's right to procreate and should be held unconstitutional un-
less it is either a necessary consequence of the government's deci-
sion to fund, or is otherwise justified by a compelling governmental
interest. Government obviously does not need to allocate AFDC
payments on the basis of the procreative choice of the welfare
mother. Government can easily allocate welfare on some other ba-
sis. For example, the government could place flat dollar caps on
benefits, which would apply regardless of the welfare recipient's
procreative choices. Alternatively, the government could, as it gen-
erally does, allocate welfare on the basis of need. Such allocative
lines would be rights-neutral and would not implicate the welfare
mother's procreative rights.212
In addition, government does not have a strong enough inter-
est to justify family cap plans. The question should be: would the
government's asserted interests warrant direct restrictions on pro-
creative rights? If not, then these interests also should not justify a
rights-based denial of funding. Family caps should fail under this
analysis. The reasons advanced for basing welfare benefit levels on
the recipients' procreative decisions are often avowed hostility to
the mother's procreative choices.213 That is, the rationale typically
advanced in support of these family cap proposals is explicitly to
discourage welfare mothers from having additional children.214
Such a rights-hostile governmental interest clearly does not suffice
as a compelling interest since the government cannot argue that its
compelling interest for violating the constitutional right is that it
objects to the right.215
Other government arguments advanced to justify family cap
plans are also not compelling. For example, the plans are some-
times justified as cost-saving devices, or as ways of ensuring equity
between the welfare recipient and the working poor who, it is
claimed, "don't get a raise if they have an additional child, even if
they need more money." Yet a mere government interest in saving
money is generally not considered sufficient to override a constitu-
tionally protected right, and in any event, flat dollar caps would ad-
vance this interest in a rights-neutral manner.21 6 Moreover, the
212. See, e.g., Dandridge v. United States, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also discus-
sion supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
213. See discussion supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
214. See generally discussion of family cap policies supra part I.
215. Of course, if the government did have a sufficiently compelling reason to di-
rectly prohibit the exercise of the right, it could also refuse to fund it. See, e.g., Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
216. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974).
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argument that increasing welfare benefits on the birth of an addi-
tional child advantages welfare recipients over the working poor is
simply incorrect. Unlike wages, welfare payments are limited to
need.217 Welfare recipients are given aid only because they need
government assistance to avoid starvation and homelessness, and
may generally receive benefits only until they are able to find em-
ployment.21s The level of government assistance is thus tied to,
and is often below, the level of need.219 Accordingly, the welfare
recipient's benefit level increases on the birth of an additional child
not as a reward or payment for the birth, but as a reflection of the
family's additional need, which is the sole basis for welfare.
Welfare recipients are still worse off than the working poor
whose salary levels are not determined by and thus not limited to
need. Although the birth of an additional child increases a working
family's need, the increased need should not affect the individual's
salary, because that salary is not determined by, or limited to, need.
Consequently, unlike welfare recipients, wage earners can earn
considerably more than they need.220 To argue that increasing
need-based aid, when levels of need increase, fosters "inequity" be-
tween welfare recipients and the working poor misprises the nature
and function of the welfare program. To compare the two payment
schemes is an apples and oranges debate. Moreover, even if reduc-
ing inequity between income classes is a legitimate governmental
concern, and even if this concern is impaired by welfare recipients'
childbearing decisions, reducing the inequity does not justify di-
rectly regulating recipients' procreative rights and should accord-
ingly not suffice to uphold rights-based benefit allocations.
Another argument is that removing the increment for the
birth of an additional child would discourage a welfare mother from
having additional children and thus make it easier for her to get off
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7).
218. Often welfare policy analyses such as that reflected in family cap proposals
seem to assume that welfare is collected instead of work, rather than because the
welfare recipients are unable to find work. To some extent, this view might be an
outgrowth of historical AFDC policy which often advocated keeping women out of the
workforce and at home with children. See generally Handler, supra note 97. How-
ever, as women's family roles, marital status, and the racial composition of AFDC
recipients changed, so did societal expectations about whether young AFDC mothers
should be expected to work. Of course, some argue that the structure of the welfare
system provides a disincentive to work and thus "fosters dependency." However, if
this argument were true, it should be viewed as a deficiency in the welfare system
rather than its purpose.
219. See supra note 207.
220. Of course, wage-earners can also earn less than their need. However, if a
wage-earner earns less than her standard of need, she is eligible for welfare.
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welfare. This may or may not be the case. 22 1 However, unless this
argument would be strong enough to justify a direct prohibition on
procreative choices of non-welfare recipients, it should not be strong
enough to justify harming a welfare recipient because of her exer-
cise of procreative rights.
Moreover, these plans are rights-hostile. With family cap pro-
posals the government exploits the recipient's poverty itself as lev-
erage to influence her private moral, behavioral, and value choices.
Because of their poverty, welfare recipients have little choice but to
submit to the government's terms in order to survive. By definition,
a welfare recipient has nowhere to go for subsistence but to the gov-
ernment. If the welfare recipient had other resources, she would be
ineligible for welfare which, by statutory design, is the safety net of
last resort. Knowing this, the government uses welfare recipients'
desperation to curtail the recipients' ability to freely make constitu-
tionally-protected value choices, and harms them in a direct and
immediate way for the exercise of the constitutional right to procre-
ative choice. Linking welfare benefits to procreative choices substi-
tutes the government's value choice for that of the welfare recipient
and constitutes excessive government intrusion into the private
moral, social, and value decisions of welfare beneficiaries. These
proposals unconstitutionally subject welfare beneficiaries to the op-
pressive control of those fortunate enough to not be dependent upon
state largesse for survival and consequently deprived of their con-
stitutionally-protected procreative rights.
Conclusion
Family cap plans raise the issue of whether government may
constitutionally use rights-based benefit conditions as a tool to in-
fluence value choices otherwise constitutionally protected from gov-
ernment intrusion.
Traditional Supreme Court doctrine answers this question by
asking whether the government benefit condition is a burden or
penalty (in other words, a government decision that takes away
something to which the individual has a right), or a mere govern-
ment refusal to subsidize (that is, a government decision to not pay
for constitutionally protected activity). If the latter, the denial of
funding is constitutional regardless of its link to constitutionally
protected activity or its harmful impact on the recipient of the
funding.
221. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11, at 737-41.
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This bifurcated approach protects the "haves" while un-
leashing the power of the government to attack the constitutional
rights of those who are recipients of government aid. This is partic-
ularly true with subsistence welfare benefits where, by definition,
the recipients are poor and dependent upon government funding for
basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter. This view thus
gives government significant power to use poverty itself as leverage
to affect otherwise constitutionally-protected value choices.
Scholars have consistently criticized the Court's approach.
However, they have focused on whether the government action has
prevented, affected, coerced, or pressured the exercise of the consti-
tutional right. In truth, the effect of the condition on the exercise of
the constitutional right is only a smoke screen. The underlying
problem with both government fines or penalties and government
funding conditions is the harm or suffering that government im-
poses because of the exercise of a constitutional right. In the former
case, the harm is the fine or penalty on the exercise of the right; in
the latter case, the harm is the loss of funding because of the exer-
cise of the right. It is this rights-based harm that is the basis for
invalidating government fines or penalties. Thus, fines or penalties
are unconstitutional even if there is no effect on the individual's
choice-that is, if the individual nevertheless elects to exercise the
rights and incur the penalty. This rights-based harm should also be
the basis for invalidating rights-based government funding
conditions.
Accordingly, this article argues, the better analysis should as-
sess the constitutionality of funding conditions on the basis of
whether they impose rights-based government harm. Under this
view, government harm that is expressly or intentionally linked to
the exercise of a constitutional right would be constitutionally prob-
lematic whether the harm is the deprivation of a right or the denial
of a benefit. Thus, a government decision to specifically exclude
rights-protected activity from funding should be impermissible if a
direct fine or penalty on the exercise of the right would be.
An exception might be where some rights-based line drawing
is necessary. However, child limitation plans do not fit within the
limited exception. The plans involve AFDC payments that gener-
ally provide for the subsistence needs of poor families. There is no
need for the government to draw a distinction in payment levels on
the basis of the welfare mother's exercise of a constitutional right to
procreate. The government can base payment levels on a myriad of
other factors. Accordingly, such benefit plans should be recognized
for what they are: rights-based, government-imposed harm and
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suffering. Accordingly, they should be subject to the same strict
scrutiny as any other attack on the right would be.
This view does not mean that the government is stripped of
power to attempt to encourage citizens to make wise procreative
choices. However, the government, in its reformist zeal, should not
be able to use unconstitutional means to achieve legitimate goals in
disregard of the constitutional protection of the fundamental right
to procreate. Instead, the government should seek constitutional,
non-oppressive means to achieve legitimate ends-means that re-
spectfully seek to persuade citizens to make wise choices rather
than bludgeon them into compliance.
As applied to child limitation plans, the government should be
held to violate the procreative rights of welfare recipients if it uses
harm and suffering, the weapons of oppression, to substitute the
government's own procreative value choice for that of the recipient.
Otherwise, what price rescue?

